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ARTICLES
HEALTH INSURANCE RATE REVIEW
John Aloysius Cogan Jr. *
The Affordable Care Act's health insurance rate review process has been
touted by government officials and consumer advocates as an effective tool to
control rising health insurance premiums. This Article argues that the current rate
review process is limited in its ability to lower health insurance costs as it does not
address the primary driver of rising premiums-the excessive prices paid by health
insurers to healthcare providers. The efficacy of the Act's rate review process is
further diminished by two additional factors: (1) a retrospective medical loss ratio
requirement that pressures insurers to lower administrative costs prior to rate
review, and (2) the limited scope of the new rate review requirements.
Nevertheless, this Article does not advocate abandoning health insurance rate
review. Instead, this Article contends that health insurance rate review holds great
potential to control healthcare costs and hold down premium increases if it is
modified from its present form, created to address century-old insurance market
defects, to be a more dynamic process that gives state insurance commissioners the
authority to correct market failures in the healthcare industry that drive up the
prices insurers pay for the healthcare services we consume.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. This Article has
benefited from comments by Michael Fischl, Rick Kay, Brendan Maher, Patricia McCoy, Peter
Siegelman, and the insights of numerous commenters at the 2015 Annual Health Law Professors
Conference.
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INTRODUCTION
The new health insurance rate review process is a central, but largely
overlooked feature of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). 1 Operating deep in the
shadows of the ACA's two most prominent, and heavily litigated, provisions
applicable to the private health insurance market-the individual mandate 2 and
the health insurance exchanges 3-the ACA's rate review process has
significantly expanded the federal government's role in health insurance
regulation. Under the ACA, rate review has transitioned from a relatively
obscure state-based administrative process into a joint state and federal effort to
collect, publish, and scrutinize health insurance rate increase requests. 4
Moreover, rate review has been touted as an effective tool to control rising
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
2. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)-(b) (2012). The so-called individual mandate requires most Americans
to have "minimum essential" health insurance or pay a tax penalty to the Internal Revenue Service.
Id. The individual mandate was extensively litigated, culminating in the Supreme Court's 2012
decision National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, which found the ACA's individual
mandate unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, but upheld the mandate's tax penalties under
Congress's Taxing Clause power. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012). The health insurance exchanges-or, more precisely, the premium
tax subsidies provided to lower income individuals and families who purchase insurance through the
federally run exchanges-were also the subject of litigation culminating in a Supreme Court decision,
King v. Burwell, which held that federal tax credits are available to individuals in states that have
federally established, rather than state established, exchanges. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
4. Unlike the individual mandate and the health insurance exchanges, the ACA's rate review
provisions have not been challenged as unconstitutional or contrary to statute. Indeed, the only lawsuit
connected with the ACA's rate review provisions was filed to compel disclosure of Missouri's
proposed rate increases for health plans sold on Missouri's federally established exchange. See Jodie
Jackson Jr., Health Insurance Rates to Be Published, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (May 20, 2015, 2:00 PM),
http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/local/health-insurance-rates-to-be-published/article-3453
e010-d3f2-521c-bldd-feafc5c9f2d3.html?comments=focus.
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health insurance rates. During the passage and rollout of the ACA, Kathleen
Sebelius, a former state insurance commissioner and then-Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), hailed rate review as a way
to prevent insurers from imposing "exorbitant, unexplained premium hikes"
5
and to "help rein in... excessive and unreasonable rate increases that have
made insurance unaffordable for many families." 6 Consumers Union, one of the
most influential consumer advocacy organizations in the United States, argues
that rate review "has the potential to not only hold down premiums" but also to
"reduce the underlying healthcare cost drivers" of health insurance. 7 Indeed, in
annual reports issued since 2012, HHS has estimated that rate review has
reduced health insurance rates by about $4.7 billion. 8 Yet, because very few
apart from actuaries, insurance experts, and insurance regulators understand the
rate review process, how it works, and its limitations, claims about the
effectiveness of rate review are difficult to evaluate. Moreover, given the general
inaccessibility of the rate review process to those who are not industry or
regulatory insiders, it should come as no surprise that little scholarly attention
has been paid to health insurance rate review. This Article ventures into the rate
review vacuum, explaining the shortcomings of rate review while also revealing
its untapped potential to control healthcare costs and contain rising insurance
rates.
The central claim of this Article is that the rate review process, as
traditionally applied by the states and implemented by the ACA, does not live
up to its potential to hold down health insurance rate increases. The primary
drivers of healthcare costs, which the current rate review process does nothing to
address, are the excessive prices charged by healthcare providers. Health
insurance rates are comprised of two basic parts: (1) the medical cost
component, and (2) the loading charge. The medical cost component is made up
5. Kathleen Sebelius, New Rules Protect Consumers from Insurance Industry Abuse, HuFFPOST
POL. (Aug. 31, 2011, 10:05 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sec-kathleen-sebelius/new-rules-
protect-consume-b_944312.html.
6. Robert Pear, Health Insurers to Be Required to Justify Rate Increases over 10 Percent, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/22/health/policy/22insure.html?_r=l&.
7. Rate Review, CONSUMERS UNION, http://consumersunion.org/topic/health-care/rate-review/
(last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
8. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RATE REVIEW ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2015)
[hereinafter 2015 RATE REVIEW REPORT], https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Forms-Reports-
and-Other-Resources/DownloadsRate-Review-Annual-Report_508.pdf (reporting savings of
approximately $1.5 billion attributable to rate review); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
RATE REVIEW ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 RATE REVIEW REPORT],
https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/defaultfiles/pdf/77041/rpt-RateReview.pdf (reporting savings of
approximately $1 billion attributable to rate review); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RATE
REVIEW ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 RATE REVIEW REPORT], https://aspe.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/pdf/178361/ratereviewjrpt.pdf (reporting savings of $1.2 billion attributable to rate
review); see also Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, 2012 Annual Rate Review Report: Rate
Review Saves Estimated $1 Billion for Consumers, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Sept.
11, 2012), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIOlResources/Forms-Reports-and-Other-Resources/rate-review
09112012a.html [hereinafter 2012 Rate Review Report] (reporting estimated savings of $1 billion
attributable to rate review).
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of all the payments made to healthcare providers for goods and services covered
by the health insurance plan. While many blame overuse of medical services (so-
called overutilization) for rising claims costs, overuse is not the most significant
problem-high prices are. We simply pay too much for the medical services we
consume. These excessive prices, which are primarily responsible for a doubling
of health insurance premiums over the last decade and a half,9 are the byproduct
of market failures in the marketplace for medical services. These market
failures-information asymmetries, moral hazard, and excess provider market
power-cannot be moderated by the ACA's rate review process, which is
modeled on a rate review process created to address a different set of market
failures present in the nineteenth-century property-casualty insurance'0 market.
Over a hundred years ago, the property-casualty market, particularly the fire
insurance industry, was beset by a boom-and-bust cycle of high profits, followed
by an influx of new insurers and intense and reckless rate competition. This
dynamic led to inadequate rates and insurer insolvencies. Insurers responded by
establishing cartels and collusive rate setting. 1 States then implemented rate
review to ensure that insurance prices were adequate (to ensure insurer
solvency), not excessive (to counter cartel pricing), and not discriminatory (to
prevent insurers from offering unwarranted discounts to attract business).' 2
Thus, rate review was never concerned with the underlying costs that drove
insurance rates, but was instead focused on the marketplace behavior of insurers,
specifically their pricing strategies and solvency problems. 13 Since the states, and
now the federal government, apply to health insurance a rate review standard
designed to address a set of market failures that existed a hundred years ago for
a different insurance product, the health insurance rate review process is simply
incapable of controlling the fundamental problems that plague today's health
insurance market-the market failures leading to excessive provider prices. As
such, rate review can do little to control the medical cost component of health
insurance rates. Simply put, there is a mismatch: health insurance rate review
uses the wrong tools for the job at hand.
This mismatch is further compounded by two additional aspects of the
ACA: (1) a retrospective medical loss ratio (MLR) requirement that pressures
insurers to lower administrative costs prior to rate review, and (2) the limited
9. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TR., EMPLOYER HEALTH
BENEFITS: 2014 ANNUAL SURVEY 20 (2014) [hereinafter KAISER EMPLOYER BENEFITS REPORT],
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/8625-employer-health-benefits-2014-
annual-survey6.pdf (noting that family health insurance premiums in the group market have more
than doubled since 2002).
10. Property-casualty insurance provides protection against losses associated with real or
personal property, including businesses, homes, and automobiles, and from legal liability to third
parties, resulting from injury or damage to persons or property. See What is Property and Casualty
Insurance?, ALLSTATE (Nov. 2015), https://www.allstate.com/tools-and-resources/insurance-basics/
property-and-casualty-insurance.aspx.
11. See infra Part II.B.1.
12. See infra Part II.B.2.
13. See infra Part II.B.2.
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scope of the new rate review requirements. The ACA's MLR requirement
affects an insurer's loading charge, which is comprised of the insurer's
administrative costs, including its costs of doing business (e.g., rent, wages and
benefits, marketing costs, taxes, and fees), profits, and contributions to
reserves.14 The ACA places a hard cap on certain administrative charges that
can be included in health insurance rates. The MLR provision works like this: if,
at the end of every year, an insurer's administrative costs included in premiums
exceed the MLR limit (15% to 20% of total premium charged, depending on the
market), the insurer must rebate the overage to its customers. Since rebates are
costly to calculate and distribute, and are therefore undesirable to insurers, the
ACA's MLR provision pressures insurers to limit administrative charges when
rates are first developed by the insurer, before those rates are submitted for rate
review. Many believe the MLR requirement is a good thing.15 However, since
the MLR requirement puts pressure on insurers to lower administrative charges
prior to rate review, the effectiveness of rate review is dampened with respect to
controlling the administrative fees in health insurance premiums.
1 6
Finally, even if the current rate review process were capable of controlling
the rising health insurance rates in a meaningful way, the effectiveness of rate
review is nevertheless weakened by the limited scope of the ACA's rate review
process: it is limited to only a small fraction of the private health insurance
market. Specifically, the ACA's rate review process applies to only
approximately 16% of the health insurance market-that is, the small group and
individual markets. 17 This limitation leaves rates for 84% of the private health
14. Insurers are required to contribute to and maintain adequate reserves to protect against the
possibility of insolvency due to future losses in excess of collected premiums. See KENNETH J. MEIER,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE CASE OF INSURANCE 46-47 (1988). For an overview
of insurer solvency and reserve requirements, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ,
INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 113-23 (6th ed. 2015).
15. See, e.g., Michael J. McCue & Mark A. Hall, Insurers' Responses to Regulation of Medical
Loss Ratios, COMMONWEALTH FUND: ISSUE BRIEF, Dec. 2012, at 1, 1-5, http://www.commonwealth
fund.org/-/media/fles/publications/issuebrief/2012/dec1634-mccue-insurers.responses-mlr-regulatio
n_ib.pdf (describing how the ACA's MLR requirement benefits consumers). But see Scott E.
Harrington, Medical Loss Ratio Regulation Under the Affordable Care Act, 50 INQUIRY 9, 10 (2013)
(suggesting the ACA's MLR requirement could produce unintended consequences, including higher
premiums, withdrawal of insurers from some markets, greater market concentration of insurers, and
barriers to health system change).
16. See infra Part IV.B. As discussed in Part IV.B infra, the MLR cap controls an insurer's
loading charges on an aggregate basis rather than on an individual insurance product basis. Rate
review, unlike the MLR cap, is capable of identifying excessive loading charges for individual
insurance products that might not push an insurer over its MLR cap. Thus, while rates for some health
insurance products may contain high loading charges, an insurer's aggregate loading charges for
products in a given market (e.g., its individual market products in a particular state) will be held down
by the MLR cap.
17. The health insurance market is divided into four different segments: the self-insured, large
employer group, small employer group, and individual markets. See infra Part II.C.1. There are
170,042,900 persons covered by private health insurance in the United States, see Health Insurance
Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-
population/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Health Insurance Coverage] (select "2013" under
"Timeframe" bar), with roughly 28 million of those persons in the small group and individual markets,
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insurance market unreviewed.'8 Thus, whatever the possible benefits of rate
review, those benefits are confined to a very small segment of the private health
insurance market; any gains to the overall private health insurance market from
rate review will be negligible.
While these arguments make for a compelling case against the efficacy of
the ACA's rate review process, this Article does not advocate abandoning rate
review for health insurance. The rate review process does indeed provide some
benefits to consumers-four to be exact. First, rate review can identify
mathematical and other errors in an insurer's rate calculations, leading to a
reduction of proposed rate increases.19 Second, rate review also functions as a
regulatory "second opinion" with respect to actuarial assumptions and
projections, and the data upon which those assumptions and projections are
based, contained within rate filings. 20 These second opinions can also lead to
reductions or proposed rate increases. 21 Third, rate review functions as a form of
disclosure regulation, providing consumers, consumer advocates, and even
competitors with information about the development of an insurer's rates. 22 In
theory, disclosure promotes both public accountability of insurers and market
discipline. 23 Fourth, state insurance regulators can use the rate review process to
impose a cap on an insurer's administrative charges or profits. 24 However, the
see infra Part II.B.1.b-c.
18. While the ACA does not require rate review of the large employer group market, a few
states require some review of large employer group market rates. See infra note 155.
19. See, e.g., Duke Helfand, Aetna Scraps 19% Rate Increase for Individual Policyholders, L.A.
TIMES (June 25, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/25/business/la-fi-aetna-rates-20100625
(health insurer rescinded request for rate increase after math errors found in filing); Duke Helfand,
Anthem Blue Cross Withdraws Request for Rate Hikes, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2010), http://articles.latim
es.com/2010/apr/30/business/la-fi-0430-anthem-20100430 (same).
20. See infra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of how rate review allows an agency to scrutinize
premiums to ensure they are "adequate" and "not excessive."
21. See, e.g., Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Ins. Dep't, 641 A.2d 1255, 1256 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994)
(state insurance commission rejected requested rate increase based in part on a difference of opinion
as to which data should be used to develop rates); see also KAISER FAMILY FOUND., RATE REVIEW:
SPOTLIGHT ON STATE EFFORTS TO MAKE HEALTH INSURANCE MORE AFFORDABLE 14-15 (2010)
[hereinafter SPOTLIGHT ON STATE EFFORTS], https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/
2013/01/8122.pdf (noting that rate filings contain "assumptions and projections that involve nuanced
judgment calls" and that rigorous rate review can result in lower rates based on an independent review
of those assumptions and projections).
22. See infra notes 205-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of how HHS subjects rate
increases it finds unreasonable to public scrutiny.
23. But see Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 647, 651 (2011) (arguing that mandatory disclosure does not improve consumer decision
making).
24. See, e.g., Anthem Health Plans of Me., Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 18 A.3d 824, 828 (Me.
2011) (refusing, based on mootness, to overturn state insurance commissioner's decision to limit for-
profit health insurer to 0% profit margin for its 2009 rates); see also Pinar Karaca-Mandic et al., States
with Stronger Health Insurance Rate Review Authority Experienced Lower Premiums in the Individual
Market in 2010-13, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1358, 1363 ex.1 (2015) (noting that in 2013 eight states employed
a rate review system for individual market products that required a minimum loss ratio of 80% or
more as a condition for approval of filed rates).
2016]
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effect of these four benefits on the overall costs of health insurance is typically
small because the lion's share of health insurance rate increases are driven not by
mathematical errors, faulty actuarial assumptions, hidden charges, administrative
costs, or insurer profits, but by increases in the prices paid by health insurers to
healthcare providers. But the outdated health insurance rate review process
currently practiced by the states and promoted by the ACA is simply incapable
of controlling rising provider prices. Health insurance rate review, however, need
not remain a weak vestige of a bygone era.
This Article contends that rate review holds great potential to control
healthcare costs and hold down premium increases, but only if the health
insurance rate review process is untethered from its antiquated property-casualty
origins and refocused on the provider price problem plaguing the health
insurance market. This transformation will require two major alterations of the
health insurance rate review process. First, rate review must be extended to
cover all fully insured health insurance products, 25 thereby maximizing rate
review's reach on the overall health insurance market. Second, state insurance
commissioners must have the ability to condition the approval of rates on an
insurer's compliance with certain orders-specifically, those designed to combat
health insurance market failures such as excessive provider bargaining power.
Such orders could range from inclusion of point-of-service incentives designed to
drive consumers to lower cost providers all the way up to setting provider
payment rates by linking those rates to Medicare benchmarks. 26 To be clear, this
reform should take place at the state, not the federal, level. The reasons for
state-based, rather than federal-based, reformation of the rate review process are
both practical and based on the benefits of federalism. The practical reasons
include the availability of expertise and resources in state insurance departments,
the willingness of some state insurance departments to take steps to control
healthcare costs, and the unlikelihood of additional federal health insurance
legislation anytime in the foreseeable future. 27 From a federalist perspective, a
state-based approach to controlling healthcare costs through rate review allows
for both experimentation by states and localized regulation to address local
conditions. While escalating healthcare costs are a problem throughout the
United States, every state has its own healthcare landscape, with its own levels of
provider and insurer market concentration, and its own unique set of healthcare
25. See infra Part II.C.1-2 for a discussion comparing the fully insured market to self-insured
groups. This is not meant to suggest that self-funded plans, regardless of whether they are covered by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), should be subject to rate review.
However, there would be a spillover effect from a more effective rate review if it is imposed on the
entire fully insured private health insurance market. See infra Part V.B.
26. See infra Part V.B for a discussion of suggested mechanisms to address price-related market
failures.
27. Indeed, the political and legal battles over the ACA still rage and show no sign of abating.
See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, The Latest Anti-Obamacare Lawsuit, and Why It Might Succeed, Explained, Vox
(Aug. 21, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.vox.com/2015/8/21/9183809/obamacare-lawsuit-republicans
(describing a pending lawsuit filed by Republicans in the House of Representatives challenging the
legality of cost-sharing subsidies provided to insurance companies).
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pricing problems. Finally, state insurance commissioners have traditionally been
given wide discretion to apply broad statutory authority to regulate their home
insurance markets. 28 In this respect, reforming the rate review process by state
legislatures to give insurance commissioners the authority to address the
underlying cost drivers of health insurance would simply continue existing
practice.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Section I describes the causes of market
failure in the marketplace for healthcare services, including information
asymmetries, moral hazard, and excess provider market power. It then explains
how these factors drive up the prices charged by healthcare providers and why
regulatory action is needed. Section II provides an overview of health insurance
ratemaking, the origins of rate review, its property-casualty roots, and the
application of rate review to health insurance prior to the ACA. Section III then
describes the new ACA rate review process. Part IV clarifies why the current
state-based rate review process and the expansion of rate review under the ACA
can do little to mitigate the market failures that drive up the prices for healthcare
services. It also explains how rate review's ability to control administrative costs
is dampened by the MLR requirement, and how rate review is limited to only a
small fraction of the private health insurance market. Finally, Section V provides
four examples of how the rate review process could be adapted to give state
insurance commissioners the authority needed to address the market failures
that drive up health insurance rates. This Article discusses four possible
conditions to rate approval: (1) obligating insurers to include in their plans
consumer point-of-service incentives, such as tiered cost sharing and reference
pricing, in order to steer consumers to lower-priced providers and stimulate
greater price competition among providers; (2) requiring insurer participation in
joint negotiations with each medical care provider possessing excess market
power to level the insurer-provider playing field; (3) requiring insurers to limit
annual provider price increases to the same percentage increases in Medicare
prices; and (4) requiring insurers to pay all providers uniform prices for a given
geographic area by pegging prices to Medicare rates (or some multiple thereof).
These are not the only approaches that can be used, but instead illustrate the
range of increasing regulatory control that a state insurance commissioner could
bring to bear to correct market failures that contribute to the high cost of health
insurance. Section V also considers possible objections to this the new rate
review process.
While the ACA expanded coverage to millions of Americans, it did very
little to address the rising costs of private health insurance. Without effective
regulatory interventions, health insurance premiums will continue their steady
rise, rendering health insurance again unaffordable and unavailable to those who
only recently gained access through the ACA. Using rate review to address
health insurance market failures is compatible with both the ACA 29 and
28. See infra Part V.A.3 for a discussion of the deference afforded to the states' regulation of
insurance markets.
29. These suggestions would require no federal changes to the ACA, as the ACA sets a floor
20161
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traditional notions of state-based insurance regulation, and does not run afoul of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 30 or other
federal laws. It is also adaptable to changing market conditions. As such, states
would have the flexibility to address local problems while also addressing the
overarching concern of rising healthcare costs.
I. MARKET FAILURE AND PROVIDER PRICES
Health insurance rates in the United States have been increasing
dramatically. This is news to no one. In 2013, for example, private health
insurance premiums in the United States reached $961.7 billion, representing
about one-third of the $2.9 trillion in total U.S. health spending.31 That same
year, nearly 6% of the total U.S. economy was devoted to spending on health
insurance premiums. 32 Closer to home, annual premiums for employer-
sponsored family health coverage reached an average of $16,834 in 2014. 33 While
up only 3% from 2013, family premiums have increased 69% since 2004 and
have more than doubled since 2002.34 To make matters worse, the cost-sharing
component of most health insurance plans-the deductibles, copays, and
coinsurance-have increased as well. 35 This means total cost increases borne by
American families for their health coverage are even greater than reflected by
premium increases alone.
What factors drive these increases? Most discussions of healthcare cost
drivers, as if responding to Captain Louis Renault's famous line in the film
Casablanca, typically "round up the usual suspects." The list of cost drivers
usually includes some or all of a wide-ranging list of potential culprits, including
"[f]ee-for-service reimbursement," "[f]ragmented delivery of care,"
"[a]dministrative burdens on providers," population health factors, "advances in
medical technology," the tax treatment of health insurance, "insurance benefit
design," a "[l]ack of cost and quality transparency," medical care market
consolidation, the high prices of medical goods and services, medical malpractice
premiums, fraud and abuse, and the structure and supply of the medical care
workforce.36 While many of these suspects can certainly be implicated in rising
for rate review while allowing states to impose stricter standards. The ACA's preemption clause states
that "[n]othing in this title shall be construed to preempt any State law that does not prevent the
application of the provisions of this title." 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d) (2012).
30. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012).
31. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2013
HIGHLIGHTS (2014), https://www.heartland.org/sites/default/files/national healthexpenditures-high
lights.pdf.
32. Id.
33. KAISER EMPLOYER BENEFITS REPORT, supra note 9, at 1.
34. Id. at 20.
35. Id. at 2-4.
36. BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., WHAT Is DRIVING U.S. HEALTH CARE SPENDING? AMERICA'S
UNSUSTAINABLE HEALTH CARE COST GROWTH 6-7 (2012), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/
uploads/sites/default/files/BPC%20Health%2Care%2Cost%2Drivers%2Brief%2OSept%202012.
pdf.
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premiums, some are more blameworthy than others. But one in particular is the
most culpable of all: the prices charged for medical services.
Medical care prices, rather than population age, utilization levels, defensive
medicine, or any other factor, 37 are the most important variable driving increases
in medical care costs. 38 Indeed, the prices charged by hospitals and physicians to
health insurers are excessive. 39 Compared to their peers in other wealthy,
developed nations, U.S. medical care providers charge significantly higher
prices. 40 But the quality of care we receive is no better, and is in many ways
worse, than the care provided in other countries where prices are lower than
37. Gerard F. Anderson et al., It's the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States Is So Different from
Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89, 90 (2003); Robert Berenson, Addressing Pricing Power in
Integrated Delivery: The Limits of Antitrust, 40 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 711, 711-12 (2015)
[hereinafter Berenson, Pricing Power]; see Barry R. Furrow, Cost Control and the Affordable Care Act:
CRAMPing Our Health Care Appetite, 13 NEV. L.J. 822, 832 (2013) (citing an economic analysis that
suggests the aging population accounts for 2%, defensive medicine accounts for 0%, and supplier-
induced demand accounts for 0% of rising healthcare costs); David A. Squires, Explaining High
Health Care Spending in the United States: An International Comparison of Supply, Utilization, Prices,
and Quality, COMMONWEALTH FUND: ISSUES INT'L HEALTH POL'Y, May 2012, at 1, 2,
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2012/may/1595-squires
explaining-high hltscare-spending-intl-brief.pdf (relying on OECD data to conclude that higher U.S.
healthcare spending cannot be attributed to higher income, an older population, or greater supply or
utilization of hospitals and doctors).
38. See COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. OFFICE OF ATr'Y GEN., EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE
COST TRENDS AND COST DIVERS 35-37 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 MASSACHUSETrS AG REPORT],
http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/healthcare/2010-hcctd-full.pdf (finding that price increases, not
utilization, caused most of the increase in healthcare costs over the study period); PAUL B. GINSBURG,
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT No. 16, HIGH AND RISING
HEALTH CARE COSTS: DEMYSTIFYING U.S. HEALTH CARE SPENDING 11 (2008), http://www.rwjf.org/
content/dam/farm/reports/reports/2008/rwjf32703 (noting empirical studies that point to technology
and price as driving growth in healthcare spending); HEALTH CARE COST INST., 2013 HEALTH CARE
COST AND UTILIZATION REPORT 1 (2014), http://www.healthcostinstitute.org/files/2013%20HCC
UR%2012-17-14.pdf (noting that higher prices for medical care and brand name prescriptions, rather
than increases in utilization, drove increases in healthcare spending in 2013); Hamilton Moses III et
al., The Anatomy of Health Care in the United States, 310 JAMA 1947, 1949 (2013); Squires, supra note
37, at 2. Technology is implicated in higher costs, but technology and price are not completely
independent cost drivers. Providers incorporating newer technology command higher prices and
benefit from higher reimbursement rates associated with the new technology. DIANA FARRELL ET AL.,
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., ACCOUNTING FOR THE COST OF US HEALTH CARE: A NEW LOOK AT WHY
AMERICANS SPEND MORE 101-04 (2008), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/health-systemns-
and.services/accounting_forthe cost of_ushealth care. Likewise, administrative costs are
significant but are also largely linked to the U.S. pricing structure and fragmented payment system. See
David U. Himmelstein et al., A Comparison of Hospital Administrative Costs in Eight Nations: US
Costs Exceed All Others by Far, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1586, 1586 (2014) (finding hospital administrative
costs linked to complex, market-oriented payment schemes accounted for 25.3% of total U.S. hospital
expenditures); James G. Kahn et al., The Cost of Health Insurance Administration in California:
Estimates for Insurers, Physicians, and Hospitals, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1629, 1629 (2005) (estimating that
billing and insurance-related functions represent 20% to 22% of privately insured spending in
California acute care settings).
39. See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 85,92
(2015) (noting that "[h]ealth care prices in the United States are excessive and inexplicable").
40. See Anderson et al., supra note 37, at 90-91.
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those charged in the United States.4'
But what causes these higher prices? One factor is income. The United
States has a higher per capita income compared to other countries. Indeed,
higher national income-as expressed in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per
capita-explains some, but not all, of the difference in spending between the
United States and its peer countries.42 If GDP per capita were the only factor
responsible for the spending difference between the United States and other
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries,
however, we would be spending roughly 72% of what we spend now.43
What, then, is responsible for the remaining price difference between the
United States and its peer nations? Market failure. The U.S. healthcare market is
plagued by widely recognized market failures" that undermine consumer
welfare, 45 and justify government intervention in the market.46 The three most
prominent market failures leading to excessive provider prices appear to be
41. See KAREN DAVIS ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL: How
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM COMPARES INTERNATIONALLY 26 (2014),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/files/publications/fund-report/2014/Jun/1755_davis_
mirrormirror_2014.pdf ("Although the U.S. spends more on health care than any other country...
survey findings indicate that from the patients' perspective, and based on outcome indicators, the
performance of American health care is severely lacking.").
42. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Why Does U.S. Health Care Cost So Much? (Part I), N.Y. TIMES:
ECONOMIX (Nov. 14, 2008, 7:30 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/14/why-does-us-
health-care-cost-so-much-part-i/?_r=0 (noting "there exists a very strong relationship between the
G.D.P. per capita of [OECD] countries (roughly a measure of ability to pay) and per-capita health
spending").
43. Id. But, even if GDP per capita explained the difference in price, the difference still would
not be justified, given the fact that the United States does not enjoy any greater benefit from the
higher prices it pays. See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 41, at 7.
44. The term "market failure" is widely used, but rarely explained. Market failure has its roots
in microeconomic theory and describes a situation in which a distribution of goods and/or services is
not efficient from a societal perspective. The first fundamental theorem of welfare economics holds
that the economy is Pareto optimal (when it is not possible to improve the well-being of any one
person without making others worse off) only under certain conditions, including, but not limited to,
perfectly competitive markets, no externalities, low transaction costs, and perfect information. When
one or more of these conditions is absent, a market can fail and government intervention may be
justified to promote efficiency. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 77-84 (3d
ed. 2000). Kenneth J. Arrow provides the seminal treatment of healthcare market imperfections. See
generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON.
REV. 941 (1963). For a more recent discussion of healthcare market imperfections, see David Dranove
& Mark A. Satterthwaite, The Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets, in 1B HANDBOOK OF
HEALTH ECONOMICS 1093, 1095-96 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000). For a
discussion of market failure specific to hospital pricing, see Brown, supra note 39, at 88.
45. See Arrow, supra note 44, at 947 ("The failure of one or more of the competitive
preconditions has as its most immediate and obvious consequence a reduction in welfare below that
obtainable from existing resources and technology, in the sense of a failure to reach an optimal state in
the sense of Pareto.").
46. See STIGLITZ, supra note 44, at 77 (explaining that the government can adopt market
correcting interventions in response to market failures).
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informational asymmetries, moral hazard, and the excessive market power of
providers. 4
7
A. Informational Asymmetries
Information problems are pervasive in the healthcare market and are
present not only during medical encounters between patients and physicians, but
also when consumers purchase health insurance.
1. Information Deficits Related to Diagnosis and Treatment
Consumers lack information about their medical conditions and therefore
must rely on medical care providers with superior knowledge. As Kenneth
Arrow noted, information asymmetry in the healthcare market results from two
basic facts of medical treatment: "the existence of uncertainty in the incidence of
disease and in the efficacy of treatment. '48 While a consumer may know she is
ill, she will likely have limited (or no) information about her illness, its severity,
or whether treatment is needed. Even if needed, there is also significant
uncertainty in medical treatment. Medical information is highly technical,
diagnoses are complex, the availability or efficacy of alternative treatments is not
always clear, and the potential for complications is always present. Furthermore,
patients cannot readily assess the quality of medical care providers. 49 These
factors make it difficult for patients-and insurers, who typically finance
treatment-to assess the necessity, value, and quality of medical services prior to
a patient's treatment. These uncertainties mean that the price paid for a
particular medical treatment may not be an accurate signal of its value.50 This
not only makes it much easier for patients (and their insurers) to pay too much
for treatment, 51 it makes it easier for providers to provide costly but not optimal,
47. But see Brown, supra note 39, at 85-86 (including principal-agent problems among the list of
market failures affecting hospital pricing); Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago's Procrustean Bed Applying
Antitrust Law in Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 857, 865 (2004) (noting that "agency relationships,
which pervade health markets, are highly influential in health care transactions").
48. See Arrow, supra note 44, at 941.
49. Indeed, there are few reliable sources of information on the quality of providers. See Uwe E.
Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57,
65-66 (2006) [hereinafter Reinhardt, Chaos] (noting that information on price and quality are rarely
available to the patient).
50. Medical services exhibit credence attributes, which means that the quality of such services
cannot be fully determined even after the services have been rendered. See Michael R. Darby & Edi
Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 (1973)
("Credence qualities are those which, although worthwhile, cannot be evaluated in normal use.");
Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Asher Wolinsky, Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the
Market for Expert Advice, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 417, 417 (2003) (noting that credence services are
plagued by information problems because they are "not easily or objectively measurable").
51. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice
System, 98 MICH. L. REv. 953, 968-69 (2000) (noting that "[tiheoretical work on markets for credence
goods predicts that markets for credence goods may be characterized by fraud (billing for unnecessary
services or services not performed) and a price mark-up over cost" (citing Asher Wolinsky,
Competition in Markets for Credence Goods, 151 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 117
2016]
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or even ineffective, treatment. 52
2. Information Deficits and the Price of Medical Care
Consumers also lack information about the cost of medical services they
receive. As Paul Starr has aptly noted, the informational "fog ... hangs thick and
low in the healthcare market. ' 53 Not only are patients hampered in their ability
to judge the value of medical services they receive, it is also difficult to obtain the
prices paid for their medical services. 54 Unlike many other countries, prices for
medical services in the United States are not readily available at the point of
service for consumers. 55 Hospitals and other medical care providers typically do
not post their prices or offer any way of comparing their prices with the prices of
other providers. 56
3. Information Deficits and the Purchase of Health Insurance
Finally, health insurance erects yet another barrier between consumers and
the costs of medical care. Information about the costs of medical care, as
reflected in insurance premiums, is obscured. Nearly half of all Americans-
about 49%-receive their health insurance through an employer. 57 The
employment-based insurance system has long obscured the total costs of health
insurance from employees. First, until recently, employees rarely knew how
much their employers contributed to their insurance premiums. Now employer
contribution must be shown on an employee's W-2, 58 although it is not entirely
clear that all employees fully understand or even notice this information. Second,
an employee receives a tax subsidy since his insurance is purchased with pretax
(1995); then citing Winand Emons, Credence and Fraudulent Experts, 28 RAND J. ECON. 107 (1997))).
52. See Henry J. Aaron, To Find the Answer, One Must Know the Question: Health Economics
and Public Policy, in INCENTIVES AND CHOICE IN HEALTH CARE 21, 30 (Frank A. Sloan & Hirschel
Kasper eds., 2008) ("[I]f physicians are willing to do more of certain things when paid well to do them,
it is hard to see why the idea that physicians might induce demand was ever controversial."). Indeed,
there is a moral hazard problem when a consumer relies on the advice of an expert-the medical care
provider-in order to choose among an array of possible treatments. See infra Part I.B. for a
discussion of moral hazard in the context of consumer choices.
53. Paul Starr, Law and the Fog of Healthcare: Complexity and Uncertainty in the Struggle over
Health Policy, 6 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 213,215 (2013).
54. See Kanu Okike et al., Survey Finds that Few Orthopedic Surgeons Know the Costs of the
Devices They Implant, 33 HEALTH AFF. 103 (2014); Reinhardt, Chaos, supra note 49, at 57-58.
55. See Starr, supra note 53, at 217 ("It is one of the ironies of the supposedly market-oriented
American system that healthcare prices are much harder to discover in the United States than they are
in many countries where prices for physicians' services are negotiated annually, posted publicly, and
easily available."); see, e.g., Jaime Rosenthal et al., Availability of Consumer Prices from US Hospitals
for a Common Surgical Procedure, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 427,428 (2013) (finding that only 16%
of hospitals studied could provide a full price quote for a total hip replacement).
56. Starr, supra note 53, at 215.
57. See Health Insurance Coverage, supra note 17 (select "2014" under "Timeframe" bar and
select "United States" under the "Location" bar).
58. This changed in 2012 when an employee's W-2 was required to show the employer's
contribution to his insurance. 26 U.S.C. § 6051(a)(14) (2012).
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dollars.59 Finally, the cost of the employer's share of the health insurance is
largely viewed as borne by its workers in the form of foregone wages. 60
B. Moral Hazard
The mere presence of health insurance can also result in market failure.
Individuals will consume more medical care, and more expensive medical care,
than they would if they had to bear the full costs of such care, thereby
dampening market pressures on the price of healthcare services.61 This
phenomenon is known as moral hazard. 62 Moral hazard takes two forms. First,
ex ante moral hazard occurs when an insured reduces the precautions she takes
for risks covered by insurance. The second form, ex post moral hazard, is more
relevant to health insurance. Under this type of moral hazard, an insured
consumes more covered healthcare services than she would have in the absence
of insurance. 63 And, the aforementioned tax subsidy64 makes the problem even
worse because employees can buy more insurance than they would have been
willing to buy with post-tax dollars. 65 Yet, while moral hazard can be somewhat
mitigated through cost sharing, such as copays, coinsurance, or deductibles,
66
insureds are likely to be insensitive to costs-and therefore the prices charged-
once they hit their cost-sharing limit. 67 And, price-insensitive consumers cannot
59. Section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code excludes employer-provided health insurance
from employees' income. Id. § 106(a). On the other hand, individuals who purchase health insurance
directly from an insurance company must pay for their insurance with after-tax dollars.
60. While employees may view health insurance as a perquisite of employment, economists
maintain that employees pay for their coverage. See Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics
of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 177, 178 (1989); see also James C. Robinson, The End of
Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622, 2623 (2001) ("Although economists maintain that employer
contributions to health insurance would have been added to wages and salaries, employees view
insurance contributions as a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, cash compensation." (footnote
omitted)). It has also been suggested that the preferential tax treatment of health insurance premiums
has caused moral hazard, that is, the purchase of too much health insurance. See Mark V. Pauly,
Taxation, Health Insurance, and Market Failure in the Medical Economy, 24 J. ECON. LITERATURE
629, 641 (1986) [hereinafter Pauly, Taxation] ("The effect of a tax subsidy then is to push the market
away from even a second best optimum, and make the extent of moral hazard (and welfare loss)
greater than would occur if coverage were not subsidized.").
61. See Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531,
533-34 (1968) [hereinafter Pauly, Economics of Moral Hazard].
62. For a general and highly insightful discussion of the concept of moral hazard, see Tom
Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEx. L. REV. 237 (1996).
63. See Willard G. Manning et al., Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence
from a Randomized Experiment, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 251,258-59 (1987) (finding that people are more
likely to consume healthcare services when their health insurance coverage provides for lower out-of-
pocket expenditures); Pauly, Economics of Moral Hazard, supra note 61, at 535 ("[T]he response of
seeking more medical care with insurance than in its absence is a result not of moral perfidy, but of
rational economic behavior. Since the cost of the individual's excess usage is spread over all other
purchasers of that insurance, the individual is not prompted to restrain his usage of care.").
64. See supra Part I.A.3 for a discussion of this tax subsidy.
65. Pauly, Taxation, supra note 60, at 641.
66. Pauly, Economics of Moral Hazard, supra note 61, at 534.
67. See James C. Robinson & Kimberly MacPherson, Payers Test Reference Pricing and Centers
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be expected to hold provider prices down. As Kenneth Arrow noted, "Insurance
removes the incentive on the part of individuals, patients, and physicians to shop
around for better prices for hospitalization and surgical care."' 68 Since consumers
are insensitive to provider prices above cost sharing, prices are generally hidden
from consumers, and since health insurance is usually subsidized by employers
and through tax treatment, excess prices charged by providers are neither a
concern to consumers when they receive covered medical care nor a
consideration when they purchase health insurance. 69
C. Market Power
The third contributor to market failure is the market power of providers.
Organized physician groups, large medical centers, and other powerful providers
wield considerable market clout when negotiating with health insurers, leading
to highly favorable payment rates 70 that then push up insurance rates. 71 Much of
this market power is the result of consolidation in the medical industry. Other
factors contribute to this market power as well. Regardless of the reason behind
the market power, the bottom line is this: providers with market power
command supracompetitive prices, and the higher prices demanded by providers
account for a significant portion of the increases in health insurance premiums.
1. Market Consolidation
Since the 1990s, U.S. hospital markets have become significantly more
concentrated, 72 with nearly half of all hospital markets considered "highly
concentrated," as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). 73
of Excellence to Steer Patients to Low-Price and High-Quality Providers, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2028, 2029
(2012).
68. Arrow, supra note 44, at 962.
69. See ANN TYNAN ET AL., CrR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, RESEARCH BRIEF No.
7, A HEALTH PLAN WORK IN PROGRESS: HOSPITAL-PHYSICIAN PRICE AND QUALITY TRANSPARENCY
4 (2008), http://www.hschange.conVCONTENT/1008/1008.pdf; Robinson & MacPherson, supra note
67.
70. E.g., Robert A. Berenson et al., Unchecked Provider Clout in California Foreshadows
Challenges to Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 699, 699-701, 703-04 (2010) [hereinafter Berenson et
al., Provider Clout] (noting that in California some large and powerful physician groups can "demand
fee increases on the order of double digits annually" (quoting a health plan executive)).
71. Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some Providers to Win Steep Payment
Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed, 31 HEALTH AFF. 973, 973 (2012)
[hereinafter Berenson et al., The Growing Power] (emphasizing that "hospital and physician payment
rate increases that outpace the rate of cost increases are major contributors to rising premiums for
employer-sponsored insurance").
72. William B. Vogt, Hospital Market Consolidation: Trends and Consequences, EXPERT
VOICES (Nov. 2009), http://www.nihcm.org/pdf/EV-VogtFINAL.pdf. Provider consolidation appears
to have been a response to the financial pressures of managed care, but a causal link has not been
firmly established. Id. The path for hospital consolidations was paved by a string of antitrust court
decisions unfavorable to the federal government and a lapse in antitrust enforcement beginning in the
1990s. Greaney, supra note 47, at 857.
73. David Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton, Hospitals, Market Share, and Consolidation, 310
JAMA 1964, 1966 (2013). The HHI is a commonly used measure of market concentration. See U.S.
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Indeed, most large metropolitan areas have highly concentrated hospital
markets. 74 Unsurprisingly, hospitals in concentrated markets charge significantly
higher prices and earn significantly higher margins from private insurers than
hospitals in competitive markets. 75
Likewise, physicians in concentrated markets also charge higher prices. 76
Although the overall market for physicians is not concentrated, certain markets
for physician services are very concentrated. For example, "markets for
specialists are fairly to highly concentrated. ' 77 Also, physician practices are
much more concentrated in some areas of the country than in others. 78 This is no
accident. "[H]ospitals and physicians have become increasingly sophisticated in
developing organizational forms primarily to increase their negotiating clout
with health plans." 79 As a result, hospitals and physicians can command greater
prices from health insurers since those providers can threaten to walk away from
an insurer's network, which could cause significant harm to the profitability of
the health insurer.80 The increases they can demand are significant, sometimes
DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 5.3 (2010),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf; Neil B. Cohen & Charles
A. Sullivan, The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the New Antitrust Merger Guidelines: Concentrating
on Concentration, 62 TEX. L. REv. 453,459-60 (1983).
74. Stephen Zuckerman & John Holahan, Despite Criticism, The Affordable Care Act Does
Much to Contain Costs, URB. INST. HEALTH POL'Y CTR., Oct. 2012, at 1, 2, http://www.urban.
org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412665-Despite-Criticism-The-Affordabe-Care-Act-
Does-Much-to-Contain-Health-Care-Costs.PDF (noting that 88% of hospital markets in large
metropolitan areas are highly concentrated).
75. See AM.'S HEALTH INS. PLANS, DATA BRIEF: IMPACT OF HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION ON
HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS 4-5 (2015), https://www.ahip.org/Epub/Impact-of-Hospital-
Consolidation/ (providing empirical evidence showing a positive correlation between health insurance
premiums and the degree of hospital concentration); James C. Robinson, Hospital Market
Concentration, Pricing, and Profitability in Orthopedic Surgery and Interventional Cardiology, 17AM. J.
MANAGED CARE e241, e241 (2011) (finding that hospitals in concentrated markets charge significantly
higher prices and earn significantly higher margins from private health insurers than their counterparts
in competitive markets).
76. Abe Dunn & Adam Hale Shapiro, Do Physicians Possess Market Power?, 57 J.L. & ECON.
159, 186 (2014) (finding that physicians in the most highly concentrated markets will charge fees that
are 14% to 30% higher than physicians in the least concentrated markets). However, physician service
prices are affected "by the relative degree of bargaining power between physicians and insurance
carriers." Id. at 161-62.
77. Martin Gaynor et al., The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets, 53 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 235, 241 (2015).
78. E.g., John E. Schneider et al., The Effect of Physician and Health Plan Market Concentration
on Prices in Commercial Health Insurance Markets, 8 INT'L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 13, 21, 23
(2008) (finding that most counties in California have highly concentrated markets for physician
organizations).
79. See Berenson et aL, Provider Clout, supra note 70, at 701.
80. See id.; see also WILLIAM B. VOGT & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND.,
RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT No. 9, How HAS HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION AFFECTED THE PRICE
AND QUALITY OF HOSPITAL CARE? 4 (2006), https://folio.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/10244/
520/no9researchreport.pdf?sequence=2 (noting a strong correlation between hospital market
concentration and rising costs of health insurance). Some insurers have even acceded to oppressive
(and ultimately illegal) payment terms due to a hospital system's market power. See, e.g., Blue Cross &
2016]
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
20% to 50%.81
2. Other Factors Contributing to Provider Market Power
Even in unconcentrated markets, so-called "must-have" providers can
command higher prices. Must-have providers are hospitals and physician groups
that insurers must include in their provider network in order to attract and retain
customers. These must-have providers have market leverage over health insurers
for reasons other than their size or the level of market concentration. For
example, providers that offer specialized services or possess sterling reputations
can often demand higher prices. 82 Also, factors unrelated to any specific
provider can sometimes create must-have providers. These factors include the
presence of "any willing provider" laws, 83 the unwillingness of consumers to
accept narrow networks, and a dwindling supply of hospital beds and physicians
in some markets. 84 As a result, health insurers cannot exclude must-have
Blue Shield of R.I., OHIC-2011-5 I 4.a. (R.I. Health Ins. Comm'r Oct. 11, 2011) (final admin. order)
[hereinafter Blue Cross Final Order], http://www.ohic.ri.gov/documents/Targeted-Market-Conduct-
Exam-Order-BCBS-and-Care-New-England.pdf. In the Blue Cross Final Order, the Rhode Island
Health Insurance Commissioner accepted a market conduct examination report regarding BCBS. Id.
3-5. In doing so, the Commissioner noted that the hospitals in the Care New England system had
the bulk of the state's maternity beds, provide high risk pregnancy and neonatal services not
otherwise available in Rhode Island, employ many obstetricians and gynecologists in the
Blue Cross network, and operate the state's only general psychiatric hospital. These factors
appear to have combined to give Care New England a significant level of bargaining power
in its negotiations with Blue Cross. As a result, Blue Cross simply could not walk away from
the Agreements ....
Id. I 4.a. Portions of the agreements were found to be illegal. Id. $ 6, 12-14, 21. The author of this
Article coauthored the examination report.
81. See MARTIN GAYNOR & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., SYNTHESIS
REPORT UPDATE, THE IMPACT OF HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION-UPDATE 2 (2012), http://www.rwjf.
org/content/dam/farm/reports/issuebriefs/2012/rwjf73261 ("The magnitude of price increases when
hospitals merge in concentrated markets is typically quite large, most exceeding 20 percent.");
Berenson et al., Provider Clout, supra note 70, at 702 (recognizing these demanded increases); Martin
Gaynor, Competition Policy in Health Care Markets: Navigating the Enforcement and Policy Maze, 33
HEALTH AFF. 1088, 1089 (2014) ("Hospital mergers that create a dominant system can lead to very
large price increases, even as high as 40-50 percent.").
82. These specialized services include level one trauma centers, burn centers, organ transplant
facilities, and children's hospitals, which in most markets do not have effective competition for their
specialized services. Berenson, Pricing Power, supra note 37, at 721; see, e.g., Blue Cross Final Order,
supra note 80, 1 4.a. (administrative adjudication involving a must-have provider that offered the
state's only high risk pregnancy and neonatal services).
83. "Any willing provider" statutes prohibit health insurers from excluding providers from the
insurer's provider networks, so long as a provider is willing and able to meet the insurer's conditions of
network participation. Ashley Noble, Any Willing or Authorized Providers, NAT'L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATORS (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/healthlany-willing-or-authorized-prov
iders.aspx. Currently, twenty-seven states have "any willing provider" statutes. Id. Many of these
statutes apply only to pharmacies, pharmacists, or allied professionals, including chiropractors,
optometrists, psychologists, and social workers. Id. However, fourteen states apply the statute to
physicians, hospitals, or both. Id.
84. See id.
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providers without risking a loss of customers.85 And, if an insurer cannot exclude
certain providers from its network because of customer demands, the insurer
loses its ability to resist those providers' demands for higher payment rates.
D. Market Failure and Higher Prices
These market failures have clear consequences. U.S. hospitals charge higher
prices for most services than do hospitals in peer countries. Likewise, physician
fees and incomes are substantially higher in the United States than in peer
countries for both primary care physicians and specialists. 86 Private payers in the
United States pay 70% higher fees to U.S. primary care physicians for office
visits and 120% more to orthopedic physicians for hip replacements than private
payers in peer countries. 87 Primary care and orthopedic physicians also earn
higher incomes ($186,582 and $442,450, respectively) than their foreign
counterparts, 8  with this higher income a function of higher prices charged rather
than increased use of services.8 9 And, despite these higher prices, health
outcomes in the United States are no better, and in many cases worse, than those
in peer countries where the prices of healthcare goods and services are lower.
90
All of these factors confound the ability of the market to control medical
care prices, and, as a result, health insurance rates. 91
E. Can Costs Be Controlled?
The asymmetries of information associated with healthcare services,
including the difficulty of identifying prices, the moral hazard associated with
insurance, and the market power of providers vis-A-vis insurers together form a
potent recipe for market failure and excessive provider prices. But, these causes
of market failure in the healthcare marketplace are difficult to correct, even in
the long run. Asymmetric information is an intractable problem in healthcare.
85. See Berenson et al., Provider Clout, supra note 70, at 702.
86. See Miriam J. Laugesen & Sherry A. Glied, Higher Fees Paid to US Physicians Drive Higher
Spending for Physician Services Compared to Other Countries, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1647, 1650-51 (2011)
(comparing physicians' fees paid by public and private payers for primary care office visits and hip
replacements in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
87. Id. at 1647.
88. Id. at 1652-53.
89. Id. at 1654 ("[H]igher US incomes do not appear to be due to a higher volume of
services .... This relationship suggests that higher fees, rather than higher practice costs, volumes, or
tuition expenses, are the main driver of higher US spending in these two areas.").
90. See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 41, at 25 (citing studies that find "that the U.S. lags in health
outcomes despite spending so much more than other countries on health care").
91. See, e.g., 2010 MASSACHUsETrs AG REPORT, supra note 38 (finding that "[p]rice increases,
not increases in utilization, caused most of the increases in health care costs ... in Massachusetts");
VOGT & TowN, supra note 80, at 4 (noting a strong correlation between hospital market concentration
and rising costs of health insurance); Berenson et al., Provider Clout, supra note 70, at 704 (finding
that provider market power has pushed California health insurance premium trends upward);
Berenson et al., The Growing Power, supra note 71, at 973 (arguing that "hospital and physician
payment rate increases that outpace the rate of cost increases are major contributors to rising
premiums for employer-sponsored insurance").
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Even if more information about prices and quality measures were made
available to consumers, information problems related to diagnoses and the
variety and efficacy of available treatments would still exist. Also, employer-
based health insurance will continue to obscure the real costs of health insurance
due to employer premium contributions and the preferential federal tax
treatment afforded health insurance benefits. The moral hazard associated with
insurance can be reduced only partially by cost sharing. Insureds will remain
indifferent to the price of healthcare services above cost-sharing limits. To the
extent that providers have already consolidated, more robust antitrust
enforcement going forward will not undo existing concentrated markets. 92 And,
must-have and specialty providers will be able to command higher prices,
regardless of the level of provider concentration. All of this suggests that some
form of regulatory action is needed to correct for the upward price distortions in
the market for medical services. 93 There is, in fact, a growing chorus of legal
scholars, health policy scholars, and economists who suggest that some form of
price-setting may be the best response to high prices. 94 The approach typically
suggested is an independent, Maryland-style, all-payer, price-setting commission
that sets hospital prices for all payers-private insurers, Medicare, and
Medicaid. 95 But, there is another alternative that is never discussed: a more
robust health insurance rate review process, updated from its antiquated
property-casualty origins to counteract market failures that afflict the
contemporary marketplace for health insurance. 96
There are many reasons why using rate review to accomplish this goal is
more preferable than simply price setting. Using rate review would be more
flexible than an across-the-board price-setting approach. It could be configured
to address local market problems and could adapt to changing conditions. It
would also be more efficient insofar as it could leverage the existing state
administrative apparatuses and the expertise of state insurance departments. No
92. Thomas L. Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers: Accountable Care Organizations and
Competition Policy, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 27-28 (2014); Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The
Provider Monopoly Problem in Health Care, 89 OR. L. REV. 847,871 (2011).
93. See STIGLITZ, supra note 44, at 77 (explaining that the government can adopt market
correcting interventions in response to market failures).
94. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 39, at 138 (concluding that price regulation "must be a central
part of any policy strategy to control health care spending"); Cutler & Morton, supra note 73, at 1969
("A third approach, if there is no other way to obtain good care except through monopoly
organizations, is for policy makers to regulate prices or total spending."); Theodore Marmor et al., The
Obama Administration's Options for Health Care Cost Control Hope Versus Reality, 150 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 485, 486-87 (2009); Joseph P. Newhouse, Assessing Health Reform's Impact on Four
Key Groups of Americans, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1714, 1723 (2010) ("Despite all of the substantive and
political problems of price setting, some sort of all-payer regulatory regime may be the only feasible
alternative."); Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Many Different Prices Paid to Providers and the Flawed Theory
of Cost Shifting: Is It Time for a More Rational All-Payer System?, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2125,2129 (2011).
95. For a brief overview of the Maryland price-setting system, see ANNA S. SOMMERS ET AL.,
NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM, POLICY ANALYSIS No. 9, ADDRESSING HOSPITAL PRICING
LEVERAGE THROUGH REGULATION: STATE RATE SETTING 2-4 (2012), http://www.nihcr.org/ltl92.
96. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the rate review process's property-casualty origins.
[Vol. 88
HEALTH INSURANCE RATE REVIEW
new state agency would need to be created. 7 But, in order to understand the
capacity of rate review to address health insurance market failures related to the
prices of medical goods and services, it is first necessary to understand how
health insurance rates are developed, the origins (and limitations) of rate review,
and the ACA's expanded rate review process.
II. RATEMAKING AND RATE REVIEW PRIOR TO THE ACA
A. Health Insurance Ratemaking
Health insurance rates, like all other insurance rates, are only estimates. An
insurance product is unlike most other products offered for sale because the cost
of insurance is not known in advance, but can be determined only after all claims
have been paid. 98 Because future claims costs cannot be known at the time
future rates (that is, rate increases) are developed, health insurance rate
increases are determined through an exceedingly complex process in which
healthcare trend factors and other rating factors are projected onto past claims
experience (the insured pool's past claims information). Healthcare trend factors
reflect the annual rate of change in the price and utilization of various healthcare
goods (such as pharmaceuticals) and services (such as physician and hospital
inpatient services). 99 These trend factors represent the underlying medical cost
of health insurance and are typically responsible for the largest part of rate
increases. 100
A host of other factors also affect rate increases. These include benefit
design changes (such as changes to covered benefits and cost sharing), changes in
the covered population (such as an increase in average age or expected
morbidity 01), the impact of legislative and regulatory changes (such as
regulatory fees, taxes, and new mandated health benefits1°2), changes to provider
networks, 10 3 as well as other factors unrelated to the cost of healthcare, such as
97. See infra Section V for a deeper analysis of whether or not rate review requires the creation
of new state agencies.
98. GEOFF WERNER & CLAUDINE MODLIN, CAS. ACTUARIAL Soc'Y, BASIC RATEMAKING 1
(4th ed. 2010), http://www.casact.org/library/studynotes/WernerModlinRatemaking.pdf.
99. AON HEWIr, 2011 HEALTH INSURANCE TREND DRIVER SURVEY 5-6 (2011), http://www.
aon.com/attachments/thought-leadership/2011 Health_InsuranceTrendDriverSurvey.pdf.
Healthcare trend represents the underlying medical cost component of a health insurance premium
increase. Id. The trend is also affected by changes in the underlying makeup of the covered group. Id.
100. Id. Due to differences in the price, delivery, and consumption of healthcare services, trend
can vary across market segments, across regions of the United States, and across different provider
networks. Id.
101. Changes in age (average claims costs increase with age), id. at 6-7, and expected morbidity
(the expected instances of illness or injury for a given group over a given period) affect rates by
increasing or decreasing expected claims costs.
102. Mandated health benefits, typically enacted under state law, refer to medical services that
"must be covered by a health insurance policy" or medical providers that must be reimbursed under a
health insurance policy. Amy B. Monahan, Fairness Versus Welfare in Health Insurance Content
Regulation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 139, 145.
103. MARK NEWSOM & BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41588,
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an insurer's need to increase its contribution to reserves, 1°4 its investment
income, 105 and adjustments for prior inadequate rates. 106
Yet, while the actual process of developing heath insurance rates is highly
complicated, one need not be an actuary to understand the fundamental
components of health insurance rates. Indeed, health insurance ratemaking is
conceptually simple. Health insurance rates result from actuarial estimates of the
expected cost of covering a particular pool of individuals under a contract for
certain health benefits for a particular period of time. In general, health
insurance rates represent the estimated amount that would be required to cover
two major cost components: (1) the expected medical claims cost (typically 80%
to 90% of the rate), which I will refer to as the medical cost component; 107 and
(2) the administrative costs of providing the coverage (including a profit
margin).108 The second component is generally referred to as the loading
charge. 109
Insurance rates, however, have not always been developed using highly
technical methods. In the 1800s, insurance rates, particularly fire insurance rates,
were often developed haphazardly, 110 resulting in financial instability for the
insurance industry. 111 This instability led directly to rate review.
B. The Origins of Rate Review
1. Property-Casualty Rate Review
Rate review112 arose not as a way to ensure lower insurance rates, but
instead as a response to collective market action in the late 1800s and early 1900s
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS AND RATE REVIEWS 5 (2011), http://digitalcommons.ilr.
cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article1793&context=key-workplace; AON HEWITr, supra note 99, at
6-9.
104. See MEIER, supra note 14, at 45.
105. See id. at 189 n.4 (providing an example of investment income as a percentage of premium
for various lines of insurance).
106. See AON HEWITT, supra note 99, at 8.
107. The medical cost component may be thought of as the actuarial cost of providing health
insurance. Paul J. Feldstein & Thomas M. Wickizer, Analysis of Private Health Insurance Premium
Growth Rates: 1985-1992, 33 MED. CARE 1035, 1036 (1995).
108. Id.; WERNER & MODLIN, supra note 98, at 204.
109. See Feldstein & Wickizer, supra note 107, at 1036-42.
110. See Spencer L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate
Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 MICH. L. REV. 545, 547-48 (1958)
(describing the history of local and regional ratemaking boards, the creation of the National Board of
Fire Underwriters, and local compacts).
111. Id.at548.
112. Scholarly treatments and court decisions generally refer to the review of filed insurance
rates as "rate regulation." E.g., German All. Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 414-18 (1914). The ACA
uses the term "rate review" to describe the process of reviewing health insurance rates. I have adopted
this term to distinguish the process by which insurance regulators review health insurance rates from
other types of regulatory controls over rates, such as restrictions on ratemaking, which place
restrictions on the variables insurers can use when determining rates.
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in the property-casualty industry, particularly the market for fire insurance.11 3
Cartels, industry associations, and ratemaking bureaus formed to combat market
failure due to a destructive boom-and-bust cycle in the fire insurance industry. 114
When there were no fires, the business of fire insurance was very profitable. This
profitability spurred competition from new market entrants, which pushed
premiums downward. This problem was exacerbated by the use of independent
agents to sell policies. 1 5 With little incentive to avoid bad risks, agents freely
issued policies to increase their commissions. As a result, insurers were saddled
with insufficient premiums and bad risks." 6 When large local fires occurred, 117
fire insurers without sufficient reserves were unable to pay the losses they
incurred from claims." 8 Consequently, insurers developed a strategy of collusion
to address the problem of inadequate rates." 9 Although this strategy was not
wholly successful due to defections by some insurers who undercut established
prices, 120 this collusion led to the first rate review law in 1909, when Kansas
granted its insurance commissioner the authority to order changes in excessive or
unjust rates. 121
The Kansas law and those that followed typically gave state insurance
commissioners the power to order changes in insurance rates or ratemaking
practices, but also allowed insurers to engage in cooperative ratemaking through
the use of rating bureaus or associations.1 2 2 The result was "regulated
113. The early property-casualty market in the United States was limited mainly to fire
insurance. MEIER, supra note 14, at 50.
114. Although insurance price-fixing began in the early 180 0 s, it did not become widespread
until after the Civil War. See Kimball & Boyce, supra note 110, at 548-49 (describing the history of
local and regional rate making boards, the creation of the National Board of Fire Underwriters, and
local compacts). For an overview of the early history of the U.S. fire insurance industry, see F. C.
Oviatt, Historical Study of Fire Insurance in the United States, 26 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
155 (1905).
115. MEIER, supra note 14, at 52.
116. Id. at 51-52.
117. Large urban fires were common in the 1800s. See Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley,
Regulating American Industries: Markets, Politics, and the Institutional Determinants of Fire Insurance
Regulation, 107 AM. J. Soc. 107, 112 (2001) (noting that "[nlearly every U.S. city burned from 1820 to
1915, yielding 40 major conflagrations, like the burning of New York in 1835 and the great Chicago
fire of 1871").
118. See MEIER, supra note 14, at 51-52.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 52.
121. Tim Bartley & Marc Schneiberg, Rationality and Institutional Contingency: The Varying
Politics of Economic Regulation in the Fire Insurance Industry, 45 SOC. PERSP. 47, 58 (2002). These
laws followed a wave of anti-compact laws passed mainly in Midwestern states, but also a few
elsewhere, from the 1890s to 1910, that represented an effort to block collusion by insurers. Id. at 53-
54. Almost immediately after passage of the Kansas law, the state's superintendent of insurance
ordered a rate reduction. Id. at 58. This prompted a legal challenge that resulted in the U.S. Supreme
Court decision German Alliance Ins. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914). Id. The Supreme Court ruled that
because fire insurance was "affected with a public interest," states had the right to regulate insurance
rates. Lewis, 233 U.S. at 408. The decision effectively endorsed the "regulated cooperation" approach
to insurance rate collusion. Bartley & Schneiberg, supra note 121, at 58.
122. See Bartley & Schneiberg, supra note 121, at 58-59.
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cooperation," through which insurers collectively set rates that were subject to
state oversight. 123 By 1930, thirty-three states had enacted some form of rate
review in the property-casualty market. 124 Rate review and regulated
cooperation also ushered in the use of objective and generally accepted rating
standards, 125 leading to the development of statistically sound rates based on
reliable claims and cost data. 126 This more rigorous approach to ratemaking
allowed state regulators to evaluate rates objectively. 127
This mode of regulation continued until 1944, when the federal government
entered the field of insurance regulation. Prior to 1944, the business of insurance
had been considered outside the scope of interstate commerce and therefore was
not subject to federal regulation, including antitrust laws. 1' In 1944, however,
the Supreme Court, in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 129
found the Sherman Antitrust Act' 30 applicable to insurance. In response to
South-Eastern Underwriters, Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act
(MFA) in 1944, granting insurers a partial exemption to allow continued pooling
of claims data and joint premium development,' 3 ' conditioned on state oversight
of the insurance industry. 132 Thereafter, nearly every state enacted a form of rate
123. See id.
124. Id. at 48.
125. Id. at 59.
126. The principle of "regulated cooperation" emerged during an unprecedented shift in the
insurance market:
Even as the principle of regulated cooperation emerged, its viability hinged on firms' and
regulators' ability to set and judge rates according to an objective and generally accepted set
of standards. Absent such a system, companies could not justify their rate-making practices,
regulators could not evaluate rate conflicts, and consumers lacked the reliable safeguards
necessary for them to endorse rate making by company associations.
Id.
127. Id. at 59-60.
128. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183-85 (1868) (holding that Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce did not include insurance, thereby precluding action against insurance
companies under antitrust law enacted pursuant to Congress's authority to regulate interstate
commerce), overruled in part by United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533
(1944).
129. 322 U.S. 533 (1944), superseded by statute, McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59
Stat. 33 (1945), as recognized in Barnett Bank of Marion Cry., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
According to the indictment, the South-Eastern Underwriters Association controlled 90% of fire and
other insurance markets in six southern states, fixed and maintained arbitrary and noncompetitive
premium rates in those markets, and maintained an illegal monopoly. The case focused on whether or
not insurance was a type of interstate commerce that should fall under the Commerce Clause and the
Sherman Antitrust Act. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 534.
130. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012).
131. See Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 222 (1979) (noting that
the MFA was meant to protect "intra-industry cooperative or concerted activities" related to risk).
132. As it turns out, however, state regulation did not have to be effective. See Sylvia A. Law &
Barry Ensminger, Negotiating Physicians' Fees: Individual Patients or Society? (A Case Study in
Federalism), 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 63 (1986) ("While the history of the [McCarran-Ferguson] Act
might have supported a requirement that state regulation be effective, the Court declined to impose
such a limit and affirmed the Act's broad deference to state regulation of insurance, whatever form it
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review legislation. 133
2. The Rate Review Standard
The rate review standard that developed post-MFA is still the standard
widely used today, for both property-casualty and health insurance. Insurance
rates are generally reviewed to ensure they are adequate, not excessive, and not
unfairly discriminatory. 134 The requirement for "adequate" rates is rooted in the
history of fire insurance in the 1880s and fears that insurers will charge
inadequate premiums to gain business. This standard requires that premiums be
sufficiently high to ensure the solvency of an insurer that experiences a high level
of claims. 135 The "not excessive" requirement was designed to blunt the ability of
insurers to set supracompetitive rates, given continued rate setting cooperation
among property-casualty insurers. 136 The "unfairly discriminatory" standard was
intended to promote equity among insureds by ensuring that rates reflected
actual risk, rather than other factors such as unjustified discounts. In other
words, similar risks must be charged similar rates.137 Thus, the "adequate, not
excessive, and not unfairly discriminatory" standard reflects governmental
concerns about the property-casualty insurance rating practices of a century ago
and embeds those concerns in current insurance regulation. Rate review focuses
took." (citing FrC v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560, 564 (1958))). The ACA attempts to change this
approach to state regulation by imposing its own effectiveness standards-albeit weak effectiveness
standards--on the rate review process. See infra Part III.A.2.
133. See MEIER, supra note 14, at 72-76 (describing the development and adoption of model
rate review laws by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and the adoption of rate
review laws by the states). Illinois was the only state that did not enact rate regulation. Stephen P.
D'Arcy, Insurance Price Deregulation: The Illinois Experience, in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-
LIABILITY INSURANCE: RESTORING COMPETITION AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY 248, 248
(J. David Cummins ed., 2002).
134. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-481(b) (West 2016) (health insurance); see also
State Approval of Health Insurance Rate Increases, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.
org/research/healthlhealth-insurance-rate-approval-disapproval.aspx (last updated Aug. 2015)
("[Health insurance rate review] statutes typically grant authority similar to Connecticut's example:
'The commissioner may refuse such approval if he finds such amounts to be excessive, inadequate or
discriminatory."').
135. Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the
Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 482-83 (1961). In light of modern solvency
requirements imposed on insurers by state insurance regulators, the requirement for "adequate" rates
is viewed by some as "a historical relic." E.g., ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 14, at 117. But see
Blue Cross Blue Shield of R.I., OHIC-2015-1, 2 (R.I. Health Ins. Comm'r Aug. 19, 2015) (amended
order), http://www.ohic.ri.gov/documents/DirectPay20l5-Amended-Order-and-Decision-20150819.pdf
(approving higher rates to ensure the insurer adequately contributes to reserves).
136. Kimball,supra note 135, at 491.
137. Id. at 495. To the extent that insurers base premiums on the riskiness of each insured,
insurers will always discriminate in terms of price. Insurers do so to avoid adverse selection and moral
hazard problems. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 14, at 133-34. The requirement that rates not
be unfairly discriminatory, however, is designed to ensure that rate discrimination is based on
information about an insured's characteristics that correlate with expected losses. Id. at 134.
Judgments about unfairly discriminatory rates can also involve consideration of social values.
Id. at 135.
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on past claims experience (as well as changes to the cost of claims over time due
to inflation) to confirm that an insurer's proposed rates will cover expected
losses and administrative costs, keep the insurer solvent, and prevent it from
charging arbitrary rates. Rate review typically does not concern itself with any
other nonactuarial factors or market conditions, including those that drive
underlying claims costs. In essence, it is a regulatory "second opinion" about the
judgments and data used by an insurer to develop its rates and a review of the
insurer's rate calculations. 138
C. Health Insurance Rate Review Prior to the ACA
Although the rate review standard ("adequate, not excessive, and not
unfairly discriminatory") was historically the same for property-casualty and
health insurance, that standard has never been uniformly applied to all segments
of the health insurance market. The ACA continues this practice. In order to
understand why rate review has not been uniformly applied in the health
insurance market, it is first necessary to understand the geography of the health
insurance market. 139 The U.S. private health insurance market is
hyperfragmented; there are not only divisions within and across states, but also
divisions created by federal law. These divisions establish the boundaries for rate
review by segregating purchasers of health insurance by risk, by law, and by
jurisdiction.
First, every state constitutes a separate market, governed by its own
insurance laws (although there is some level of uniformity due to adoption of
model laws promulgated by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners 140 and federal laws, such as the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996141) and subject to oversight by its own insurance
department, with its own resource constraints and practices. Contained within
each state market are three fully insured 142 submarkets: the large group, small
group, and individual markets. Each of these submarkets represents different
classes of risk, and each is governed by different economic considerations and
138. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
139. For a description of the regulatory landscape of the highly fragmented health insurance
market in terms of its "geography," see Mark A. Hall, The Geography of Health Insurance Regulation:
A Guide to Identifying, Exploiting, and Policing Market Boundaries, 19 HEALTH AFF. 173, 173 (2000).
140. For an overview of the role of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) in developing model insurance laws, see Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United
States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 625, 640-60 (1999).
141. Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. 29). For a
brief overview of the major pre-ACA federal laws governing health insurance, see TIMOTHY
STOLTZFUS JOST, THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 25-30 (2009),
https://www.nasi.org/usr_docarheRegulation ofPrivateHealthInsurance.pdf.
142. An employer health plan is fully insured if the employer purchases a health insurance
policy from a licensed health insurer. In exchange for a premium payment by the employer, the insurer
bears the full risk for all claims covered by the health insurance policy.
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regulations. 143 There are also self-insured employer groups, which do not
purchase health insurance from an insurance company but instead provide an
insurance-like plan to their employees by directly bearing (at least some of) the
cost of the medical goods and services consumed by those employees. 44 Most,
but not all, self-insured plans are exempt from state regulation. 145 Each of these
different markets is more fully discussed below.
1. The Fully Insured Markets
a. The Large Group Market
The large group market, 146 which covers employers with more than fifty
employees, 147 is the largest segment of the fully insured market, covering about
48 million employees and their dependents. 148 Large groups "enjoy economies of
scale and purchasing power," which results in very low administrative costs. 149
The size of the group also provides some protection against rate volatility. In
other words, one or two very sick employees (or covered dependents) will not
significantly affect future costs for the group because of the group's size. 150
Finally, large groups, with their dedicated human resources staff (i.e., a
company's human resources department) are perceived as sophisticated and able
143. Hall, supra note 139, at 173.
144. This contractor is also known as a third-party administrator, or TPA.
145. See infra Part II.C.2 for a discussion of self-insured employer groups.
146. Although some commenters combine fully insured and self-insured large groups for the
purposes of discussion, I treat these groups separately, following state insurance codes. See, e.g., 27
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 27-18.6-1 to -12 (West 2016) (covering only fully insured large groups).
147. Prior to the ACA, the large employer group market consisted of employers with fifty-one
or more employees, and the small employer group market consisted of employers with fifty or fewer
employees. Although the ACA amended these definitions to enlarge the small employer group market
to include employers with up to 100 employees as of January 1, 2016, Congress later amended the
ACA to retain the original definitions of large and small group employers. Protecting Affordable
Coverage for Employees Act, Pub. L. 114-60, 129 Stat. 543 (2015) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). For the reasons behind the change, see Timothy Jost, PACE and EACH Acts Pass House;
CMS Addresses Consumers Enrolled in Multiple Plans (Updated), HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Sept. 29,
2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/09/29/implementing-health-reform-pace-and-each-acts-pass-
house-cms-addresses-consumers-enrolled-in-multiple-plans/.
148. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-101R, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE:
CONCENTRATION OF ENROLLEES AMONG INDIVIDUAL, SMALL GROUP, AND LARGE GROUP
INSURERS FROM 2010 THROUGH 2013, at 10 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667245.pdf (2013
figures). The GAO measured enrollment in fully insured health insurance plans by measuring covered
"life-years, which represent the average number of lives insured.., on a pre-specified day over the
[twelve] months in the reporting year." Id. at 3 n.14.
149. Hall, supra note 139, at 174. Large group plans have high medical loss ratios (MLRs),
typically in the high eighties or low nineties. Id. In other words, the percentage of premium dollars
used to pay claims was usually in the high eighties to low nineties. For an overview of the MLR
statistic and its use in the ACA, see Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR),
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Feb. 29, 2012), http://kff.org/health-reforn/fact-sheet/explaining-health-
care-reform-medical-loss-ratio-mlr/.
150. See Allison K. Hoffman, An Optimist's Take on the Decline of Small-Employer Health
Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 113, 118 (2013).
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to bargain effectively with insurers. 151 As a result, large groups, especially if they
are very large (i.e., they have 500 or more employees) are typically experience
rated. 15 2 This means that the group's own prior medical claims experience is used
to project rate increases using current trend factors.5 3 For these reasons, the
large group market was (and still is) generally viewed as well functioning 5 4 and
was subject to few legal restrictions. Thus, the majority of states conducted no
rate review of large group rates. 55
b. The Small Group Market
The small group market typically consists of employer groups with fifty or
fewer employees. 156 An estimated 17 million are insured in the small employer
market.'5 7 Prior to the ACA there was a "fair degree of uniformity" in state
regulation of the small group market due to state and federal reform efforts in
the 1990s.158 In the small group market, health insurance was offered in all states
on a guaranteed issue basis, meaning that any small employer could obtain
health insurance for its employees. 159 Rates were typically calculated based on
the characteristics of the specific employer group, such as age, gender, and the
number of employees t6° Small group rates were also subject to a health status
151. Seeid. at 124.
152. John Bertko, Adjunct Staff, RAND Corp., Health Insurance Market Practices, Testimony
Presented Before the Senate Finance Committee (Sept. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Bertko Testimony],
http://www.rand.org/contentdamrand/pubs/testimonies/2008/RANDCT315.pdf. By insuring a large
number of independent risks, the experience of the entire group becomes more stable and can be
more accurately predicted. This is the basis for experience rating. For other insured groups, however,
the volume of data used for overall ratemaking may not always be fully sufficient to produce accurate
and stable rates, and the actuary must supplement existing data with additional information. WERNER
& MODLIN, supra note 98, at 216.
153. Bertko Testimony, supra note 152, at 3-4. If, on the other hand, a group's experience is not
credible, then the group's rate is projected based on a blended average of the employer group's claims
experience and manual rates. Id. Manual rates determined for an entire block of business are applied
in cases where the experience of a group is not credible. See Kristi Bohn, Jay Ripps & Richard S.
Wold, Pricing of Group Insurance, in GROUP INSURANCE 501, 508-09 (William F. Bluhm ed., 6th ed.
2013). Credibility is the predictive value an actuary ascribes to a particular body of claims data.
ACTUARIAL STANDARDS BD., ACTUARIAL STANDARD OF PRACTICE No. 25, CREDIBILITY
PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO ACCIDENT AND HEALTH, GROUP TERM LIFE, AND
PROPERTY/CASUALTY COVERAGES 1 (1996), http://www.actuarialstandardsboard.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/07/asopO25_051.pdf. Claims data for a particular employer group may not be credible for
a variety of reasons, including the size of the employer, changes to the size or makeup of the
employees, and insufficient claims data.
154. See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 23,30-31 (2001).
155. Rate Increase Disclosure and Review, 75 Fed. Reg. 81004, 81006 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010)
(codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 154) [hereinafter Rate Increase Disclosure and Review Proposal] (noting
that only eighteen states have authority to review rates for some or all of the large group market).
156. The definition of the small employer group was recently amended. See supra note 147.
157. 2014 RATE REvIEw REPORT, supra note 8, at 5.
158. See Hall, supra note 139, at 175.
159. See Bertko Testimony, supra note 152, at 3.
160. Id.
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factor. 161 This meant that a small employer group's rates could be adjusted based
on the health status of its employees. However, rates in the small group market
were often constrained by rating band limitations, which limited the variation of
health insurance rates that could be charged. 16
2
The pre-ACA small group market was plagued by high administrative costs
and rate volatility. The average cost of insurance coverage was much higher for
small employers than for large employers because insurers incurred higher
administrative costs covering small employers. 163 Also, small employer group
rates were more volatile. Since the costs of one very sick employee could affect
the rates charged to the small employer group, a small group's rates could
increase significantly if even one employee incurred high healthcare costs. 164 For
these reasons, small group rates were subject to a much greater level of
regulation than the large group market; most states (and the District of
Columbia) had some form of rate review for the small group market just prior to
the ACA. 165 Although this fact may give the impression that small group rates
were closely reviewed, this was not the case.
In the years leading up to the enactment of the ACA, there was substantial
variation among states with respect to health insurance rate review in the small
group market. Some states conducted careful reviews while others conducted no
review at all. Some states "only require[d] insurers to file an 'actuarial
certification' attesting that their rates were in compliance with state law, without
providing any underlying documentation."' t 66 Even in states that conducted rate
review, there was wide variation in the types of insurers subject to rate review
and the type of review applied. For instance, some states applied rate review
only to Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) insurers and exempted Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and commercial insurers 167 from review,
while other states did the opposite-they exempted BCBS insurers and reviewed
the rates of HMOs or commercial insurers. 16 There was also wide variation in
161. Id. A few states also applied adjusted community ratings, under which insurers could not
vary rates by health status or other factors. Id.
162. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET REFORMS: RATE RESTRICTIONS 2
(2012), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8328.pdf.
163. MLRs in the small group market are usually in the high seventies to mid-eighties. Hall,
supra note 139, at 174.
164. Hoffman, supra note 150, at 118.
165. BRENT D. FULTON & RICHARD M. SCHEFFLER, HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUM RATE
REVIEW REGULATION: CASE STUDIES TO INFORM CALIFORNIA 14 tbl.1 (2012), http://petris.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/CPAC-Fulton-Scheffler-rate-review-study-F.pdf.
166. SPOTLIGHT ON STATE EFFORTS, supra note 21, at 4, 19 app.A; Adele M. Kirk & Deborah J.
Chollet, State Review of Major Medical Health Insurance Rates, 20 J. INS. REG. 3, 7-10 (2002). In some
states, aggressive rate regulation was not considered necessary because no carrier had a large
percentage of the market, and price competition was assumed to hold rates down. SPOTLIGHT ON
STATE EFFORTS, supra note 21, at 4.
167. State insurance laws often distinguish between BCBS, HMO, and commercial health
insurers. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 27-19-1, 27-19.2-1,27-2-1 (West 2016) (BCBS); id. §§ 2741-
1 to -85 (HMOs); id. §§ 27-18-1 to -81 (commercial insurers).
168. See Kirk & Chollet, supra note 166, at 7-10.
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how rate review was conducted. In states that required rates to be filed, any
number of rate review processes could have been applied, including filing for
informational purposes only; a "file and use" system that allowed an insurer to
use rates upon filing, subject to subsequent scrutiny by the state; 169 prior
approval; and prior approval with a provision deeming rates approved if not
promptly reviewed (usually within sixty days). 170 States even applied these rate-
filing processes differently, with some engaged in a much more active rate review
process than others. There was also wide variation in what was considered an
acceptable rate and what triggered review.171 As a result, most states reduced
rates less than one-third of the time. 172 Many states never reduced rates. 173
c. The Individual Market
The individual (or nongroup) market covers health insurance purchased
directly from an insurer, typically by the self-employed, unemployed, or those
who do not get health insurance through an employer. Roughly 11 million
people get private health insurance directly from an insurer. 174 Prior to the
ACA, the individual market was regulated almost entirely by the states, with
significant regulatory variation between the states. 175 Medical underwriting of
individual applicants was commonplace. 176 Rates typically differed based on
factors such as age, gender, and health status. As a result, rates varied
significantly. High-risk or high-cost individuals would be charged very high rates
or denied coverage altogether.177 Consequently, a high number of applicants for
individual market insurance could not get (or could not afford) coverage in the
individual market.1 78 While some states had so-called high risk pools that were
available to cover those who could not obtain insurance in the individual market,
premiums in these pools were typically much more expensive than premiums in
the individual market. 79 In addition, administrative costs in the individual
market were very high, due in part to underwriting and marketing expenses. 180
169. This is a form of retrospective rate regulation that often relies on consumer complaints to
indicate a problem. SPOTLIGHT ON STATE EFFORTS, supra note 21, at 4.
170. See Kirk & Chollet, supra note 166, at 7; SPOTLIGHT ON STATE EFFORTS, supra note 21,
at 5.
171. See Kirk & Chollet, supra note 166, at 15.
172. See id. at 12.
173. Id.; see also Fulton & Scheffler, supra note 165, at 14 tbl.1 (noting extreme variation among
states in the percentage of small group rates disapproved, withdrawn, or lowered following review).
174. See 2014 RATE REVIEW REPORT, supra note 8, at 3 (2013 figures).
175. See Hall, supra note 139, at 175.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, SOUEEZED: WHY RISING
EXPOSURE TO HEALTH CARE COSTS THREATENS THE HEALTH AND FINANCIAL WELL-BEING OF
AMERICAN FAMILIES 4 (2006), www.commonwealthfund.org/usr-doc/Collins-squeezedrisinghltcare
costs_953.pdf?section=4039.
179. Bertko Testimony, supra note 152, at 3.
180. See Hall, supra note 139, at 175. MILRs for the individual market were typically in the
sixties to mid-seventies. Id.
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As was the case in the small group market, individual market rates were
also subject to review in most states and the District of Columbia prior to the
ACA.181 The basis for rate review for individual market rates was typically the
"adequate, not excessive, and not unfairly discriminatory" standard. And, much
like the small group market, rate review in the individual market was very
inconsistent. States employed different filing requirements and each state
imposed its own filing requirements for different types of insurers. 182 As a result,
in 2010, on average, fewer than a quarter of reviewed filings were disapproved,
withdrawn, or resulted in lower rates. 183
2. Self-Insured Groups
In contrast to fully insured employer groups, self-insured employer groups
do not purchase health insurance from an insurance company. Instead, they bear
the risk, at least partially, 184 of the medical expenses of their employees (and the
dependents of the employees) through an insurance-like employee benefit plan.
Self-insured employer groups typically contract with a third-party administrator,
usually a health insurer, 185 that provides the same type of administrative services,
provider networks, and other administrative features of a health insurance policy
provided by a fully insured employer group. Thus, in many ways, self-insured
and fully insured employer groups are indistinguishable. 186 There are, however,
two critical differences. First, as noted above, an employer offering its employees
coverage through a self-insured plan bears the risk of paying the medical claims
of its employees. Second, most, but not all, 187 self-insured plans are governed by
ERISA and are exempt from state regulation. 188 As such, state-based rate review
does not apply to self-insured plans. Very few small employer groups are self-
insured, so large employer groups make up the bulk of self-insured plans. 189
181. See Fulton & Scheffler, supra note 165, at 14 tbl.1. Thirty-four states required some form of
prior approval, fourteen employed a file and use system, and three states conducted no review of
individual market rates. Id.
182. Kirk & Chollet, supra note 166, at 13; see also Fulton & Scheffler, supra note 165, at 14
tbl.1 (noting extreme variation among states in the percentage of small group rates that were
disapproved, withdrawn, or lowered following review).
183. Fulton & Scheffler, supra note 165, at 13.
184. Self-insured plans typically buy stop-loss insurance to cover excess claims. This has the
effect of moderating an employer's risk by capping its liability. Hall, supra note 139, at 173-74.
185. See Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or "One Good Loophole
Deserves Another," 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHics 89,95 (2005).
186. See id. (noting that "most employees in self-insured EHBPs (employee health benefit
plans] submit claim forms to and have their covered medical expenses paid by an entity other than
their employer, oblivious to the distinction that the TPA is paying claims with the employer's money
rather than with its own").
187. Exceptions include, among others, state and local government plans and church plans. 29
U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1)-(2) (2012).
188. Id. § 1144(a), (b)(2). For a brief but highly accessible explanation of ERISA's preemption
of state laws, see Brendan S. Maher, The Affordable Care Act, Remedy, and Litigation Reform, 63 AM.
U. L. REV. 649,666-68 (2014).
189. See Paul Fronstin, Self-Insured Health Plans: State Variation and Recent Trends by Firm
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Sixty-one percent of U.S. workers are covered by self-insured plans. 190
3. All Markets Share the Same High Prices
Despite the considerable economic, legal, and structural differences
between the aforementioned health insurance markets, and despite the varying
applicability of rate review to those markets, they all share one significant, but
widely overlooked, common feature: they all use the same provider payment
arrangements. Regardless of whether a plan is fully insured or self-insured,
whether it is in the large group, small group, or individual markets, all plans
insured or administered by the same insurer (regardless of whether it is a BCBS,
HMO, or commercial insurer) are all subject to the same provider prices. In
other words, when a health insurer contracts for payment rates for providers in
its network, the prices contained in those contracts are paid by the insurer for all
claims for medical services made by anyone covered by the insurer's fully
insured plans (large group, small group, individual markets), as well as those
covered by a self-insured plan for which the insurer acts as an administrator. 191
Thus, while some markets, such as the self-insured and fully insured large group
plans, are viewed as "well functioning," from an administrative and risk-
spreading perspective, 192 those market segments are subject to the exact same
underlying price pressures as their less well-functioning cousins, the small group
and individual markets. This means that the price of medical care is the same for
all markets. From this perspective, the self-insured and fully insured large group
markets function no better than the individual and small group markets-they
are all subject to the same market failures and the same high provider prices. 193
Thus, the health insurance market divisions and risk segmentation discussed
Size, NOTES (Emp. Benefits Research Inst., Washington, D.C.), Nov. 2012, at 2, 4 (2011),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI-Notes_11_Nov-12.Slf-Insrdl.pdf.
190. KAISER EMPLOYER BENEFITS REPORT, supra note 9, at 174.
191. See, e.g., RECTOR & Assoc., INC., BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD OF RHODE ISLAND:
REPORT ON HOSPITAL PARTICIPATION AGREEMENTS WITH THE CARE NEW ENGLAND HEALTH
SYSTEM 5-6, (2010), http://www.ohic.ri.gov/documents/Targeted-Market-Conduct-Exam-Report-
BCBS-and-Care-New-England-Jan-2009.pdf (market conduct examination report noting that
reimbursement contracts between BCBS of Rhode Island and hospitals in the Care New England
health system covered all "Commercial Subscribers," which included individual, fully insured groups,
and self-funded groups). The author of this Article was an examiner for this report.
192. See infra Part II.C.1 for a discussion of these markets and their perceived functionality.
193. This largely unnoticed and rarely discussed aspect of the health insurance cost equation is
key to understanding why most health insurance market reforms will not stem rising health insurance
premiums. No matter how the various markets could be reconfigured (e.g., expanding the small group
market to include groups of 100 or more employees or merging the small group and individual
markets), such market reconfigurations will have no effect on the underlying costs of medial care,
which is the largest component of health insurance premiums and the reason why premiums are
skyrocketing. While rearranging the market could alter the expected morbidity of a particular pool of
insureds and could raise or lower the administrative burden borne by insurers, both of which would
affect premiums, such market reconfigurations will never alter the balance of market power between
providers and insurers. Providers will still be able to demand and receive high prices. Thus, any
reconfiguration of the market, while addressing equity concerns among highly segmented insured
populations, will not affect the increasing cost of health insurance.
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above that are so often the focus of debate and reform efforts ultimately make
no difference when it comes to the underlying cost of medical care. Large fully
insured and self-insured groups may be in a better position than small groups or
individuals to haggle with an insurer over the administrative charges included in
a rate or the terms of an insurance plan's coverage provisions, but those large
groups have no more input in the payment terms embedded in the contracts
between an insurer and the providers in its network than an individual who
purchases a single health insurance policy directly from an insurer.
III. HEALTH INSURANCE RATE REVIEW UNDER THE ACA
In response to increasing health insurance rates194 and unevenly applied
rate review processes by the states, 195 the ACA included a rate review provision
that sought to do two things: (1) bring nationwide uniformity to the review of
health insurance rates, and (2) improve rate review at the state level through
$250 million in federal grants. 196
In some ways, the ACA's expansion of rate review is quite remarkable. For
the first time in any consumer insurance market (e.g., health, property-casualty,
life), 197 the federal government can substitute its judgment for that of state
194. Congress included the ACA's rate review process in the Act as a response to double-digit
premium increases. See Timothy Jost, HR 3962: The Affordable Health Care for Americans Act,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 30, 2009), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2009/10/30/hr-3962-the-affordable-
health-care-for-americans-act/ (characterizing the ACA's rate review provision as apparent
congressional "push back" against insurers' demand for double-digit premium increases"). Its
inclusion also responded to perceived price gouging by insurers. Id. Rate review first appeared in a
2009 health reform debate before the U.S. House of Representatives. See Affordable Health Care for
America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 104 (1st Sess. 2009) (requiring insurers to justify increases in
premiums through a rate review process implemented by the federal and state governments).
195. See supra Part II.C for a discussion of states' inconsistent application of the rate review
process.
196. See Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, State Effective Rate Review Programs, CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICARE SERVS., https://www.cms.gpv/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-
FAQs/rate review fact sheet.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2016) [hereinafter State Effective Rate Review
Programs] ("The Affordable Care Act makes $250 million available to States to take action against
insurers seeking unreasonable rate hikes. To date, 43 States and the District of Columbia are using
$250 million in grants provided by HHS to help them improve their oversight of proposed health
insurance rate increases."); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-94(c) (2012) (describing the ACA's rate review
process). Grants could be used to help states carry out rate review, including reviewing requests for
rate increases, providing information to HHS, and establishing centers to analyze rate information. See
id. § 300gg-94(c)(1). In all, forty-three states and the District of Columbia were awarded rate review
grant funds. Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Rate Review Grants, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICARE SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Rate-Review-Grants/index.htmil (last
visited Apr. 1, 2016). States generally used grants to hire additional staff, increase the scope of review
to cover products in the small group and individual market not previously reviewed, increase
transparency of the review process, and upgrade technology. Id.
197. To be clear, there are insurance programs run entirely by the federal government. One
example is the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The NFIP, however, is fundamentally
different from typical state-based insurance. The NFIP is a public-private partnership in which the
federal government underwrites the risk and private insurers sell the policies in exchange for a
commission. Jennifer Wriggins, Flood Money: The Challenge of U.S. Flood Insurance Reform in a
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regulators with respect to a core function of state insurance regulation-
assessing the reasonableness of insurance rates offered to the public-in cases
where the federal government has determined that a state's rate review process
is not "effective." While this change to the post-MFA insurance regulatory
landscape appears seismic in nature, the effect is much less dramatic. Rate
review has changed little under the ACA. While the ACA shines more light on
health insurance rate increases through greater disclosure, little heat
accompanies that light. The ACA neither compels the reduction of unreasonable
rates nor addresses market failures that lead to high prices.
A. The Mechanics of Rate Review Under the ACA
The ACA's rate review process, which took effect in 2011,198 mirrors
existing state practice in critical ways. It consists primarily of an evaluation of
actuarial assumptions and underlying rate filing data, which can identify
computational errors and reveal unjustified assumptions. 199 And, consistent with
pre-ACA state practice, the ACA's rate review provisions apply only to rate
increases 200 in the small group and individual markets. 20 1 Rates charged in the
large group market, 2°2 by grandfathered plans,20 3 and by self-funded plans are
Warming World, 119 PENN ST. L. REv. 361, 381 n.100 (2014). The NFIP did not establish a situation
where the government usurped state authority over insurance, but rather, one in which the
government essentially became the insurer.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-94(a)(1).
199. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text for a brief summary of rate review's efficacy
as an error detector in determining proper health insurance rates.
200. Although the ACA directed HHS to establish a process to review "unreasonable increases
in premiums," 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-94(a)(1), the review process actually applies to "rates" charged by an
insurer for a particular insurance product rather than to the premium charged to a particular policy
(that is, the price charged to a particular policyholder based on that policyholder's characteristics, such
as smoking status). Since state review of an insurer's request to increase its premiums has typically
focused on an actuarial review of the underlying methods and data used to develop the "rate" to be
charged for a specific insurance product, HHS has focused its review process on the data and methods
underlying rate increases, rather than the price charged any particular insured. As such, HHS's
practice is consistent with rate reviews conducted by the states. See Rate Increase Disclosure and
Review Proposal, supra note 155, at 81004-05, 81009; Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs & Ctr. for Ins.
Policy & Research, Comment Letter on Proposed Regulations Regarding Section 2794 of the Public
Health Service Act passim (May 12, 2010), http://www.naic.org/documents/committees e hrsi hhs
response rradopted.pdf (comparing the proposed rate review to state practice). Thus, while a
product's rate increase could fall below the 10% review threshold, because a rate increase is calculated
through a weighted average of premium increases, any particular customer could nevertheless be
charged a premium increase in excess of 10%. See Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: The
Premium Review Regulation, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Dec. 22, 2010), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/
12/22/implementing-health-reform-the-premium-review-regulation/ [hereinafter Jost, Implementing
Health Reform] (observing that "the regulation does not necessarily capture all unreasonable
'premium' increases").
201. 45 C.F.R. § 154.103(a) (2016). The ACA does not alter or limit the extent or manner that
states can review rates charged for products and markets not governed by the ACA's rate review
process. Thus, existing state rules regarding the review of rates outside of the small group and
individual markets remain unchanged.
202. Although the statutory provision establishing rate review applies to all group health
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not covered. However, the ACA differs from state-based practice in one critical
respect: disclosure. The ACA attempts to promote greater insurer accountability
through heightened disclosure requirements applicable to all individual and
small group rate increases in all states.
1. New Federal Filing Requirements
Under the ACA review process, all proposed rate increases for
nongrandfathered products sold in the small group and individual markets must
be filed with HHS.20 4 If the proposed rate increase is 10% or more,205 insurers
insurance coverage, which includes insurance offered in the small and large group markets, HHS has,
through regulations, limited application of the rate review provision to the individual and small group
markets. 45 C.F.R. § 147.102; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Health Insurance
Market Rules; Rate Review, 77 Fed. Reg. 70584-01, 70589 (proposed Nov. 26, 2012) (codified at 45
C.F.R.§. 147.102) (footnotes omitted). HHS gave three reasons for its decision not to apply rate review
to the large group market. First, only about one-third of states have the authority to review large
group rates. Thus, applying rate review requirements in the large group market "would result in a
process that is not closely aligned with most State processes upon which the regulation is modeled."
Rate Increase Disclosure and Review Proposal, supra note 155, at 81006. Second, many insurers "are
not accustomed to submitting proposed rate increases" for the large group market. Id. Third,
"purchasers in the large group market have greater leverage than those in the individual and small
group markets, and therefore may be better able to avoid imposition of unreasonable rate increases."
Id. The first two justifications are simply different versions of the same reason-large group rates are
typically not reviewed by the states. The widely held assumption underlying the hands-off approach to
large group rates is that these groups are sophisticated and have sufficient bargaining power to protect
their own interests. E.g., Hyman & Hall, supra note 154, at 30-35. Yet there is no empirical evidence
to support the notion that large groups can wholly protect themselves from unreasonable rates, and
there is at least some evidence to the contrary. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Health Ins.
Comm'r of R.I., Health Insurance Commissioner Finds Blue Cross Blue Shield of Rhode Island
Engaged in Improper Rating and Underwriting Practices (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.ri.gov/
press/view/19085 (explaining that the Rhode Island Health Commissioner found that BCBS of Rhode
Island had engaged in illegal, discriminatory and abusive rating practices in the large group market
during the period of 2007 to 2009). The author of this Article coauthored the examination report.
203. 45 C.F.R. § 154.103(b). The ACA provides for the "grandfathering" of certain health
insurance plans that existed as of March 23, 2010 (the date the ACA was enacted) and have not been
changed in ways that substantially cut benefits or increase costs for consumers. Id. § 147.140(a)(1)(i).
Grandfathered plans, which can be sold to individuals or groups, are exempt from many, but not all, of
the new insurance market reforms. Id. § 154.103(b).
204. Id. § 154.215(a).
205. HHS set 10% as a threshold for identifying "potentially unreasonable rates" that would be
subject to review. Rate Increase Disclosure and Review Proposal, supra note 155, at 81006. The 10%
threshold, a uniform standard applicable to all rate increases nationwide, could change to a state-
specific threshold. 45 C.F.R. § 154.200(a)-(b). A state-specific threshold is supposed to be based on
state-specific factors, to the extent that such factors are available. Id. § 154.200(a)(2). A rate increase
in the individual and small group markets that is 10% or more, applicable to a twelve-month period,
would be subject to federal review. Id. § 154.200(a)(1). The 10% threshold is based on the average
increase for all enrollees weighted by premium volume. Id. § 154.200(c). Although the 10% threshold
may be replaced by a state-specific threshold determined by HHS, id. § 154.200(a)(2), no state-specific
thresholds have yet been set. HHS denied requests for higher thresholds from Alaska and Wisconsin
in 2012. See Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Oversight, State-Specific Threshold Proposals, CRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insur
ance-Market-Reforms/sst.htmil (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
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must also, prior to implementation of the increase, submit a "preliminary
justification" for the proposed rate increase to HHS and the insurance
department in the state in which the rates will apply. 20 6 HHS will then publicly
disclose this information on its website, 2 7 but will not necessarily review the
proposed rate increase. Instead, HHS will review only the filed rate information
if HHS has determined that the state in which the rates will apply does not have
an "effective" rate review program.208
2. Effectiveness of State Review
HHS will determine that a state has an "effective" rate review program if
(1) the insurer requesting the rate increase submits specific data and
documentation to the state, 20 9 (2) the state conducts a "effective and timely"
review of the documentation submitted by the insurer,210 and (3) the state's
determination of whether a rate increase is reasonable (or not) is made pursuant
to a standard set forth in a statute or regulation. 211 The state's review must also
include an examination of data and documentation related to the reasonableness
of the assumptions used to develop the proposed rate increase, the validity of the
historical data underlying the assumptions, and data related to past projections
and actual experience, among other factors.212 In addition, the state must make
206. 45 C.F.R. §§ 154.200(a), 154.215(a)-(g). The preliminary justification must include, among
other things, data related to rate development for the product, historical and projected claims
experience, trend projections, claims assumptions related to any product benefit changes, and a history
of rate increases for the product. Insurers must also submit a written description of the rate increase
including, among other things, a description of the data and the assumptions used to develop the rate
increase, and an explanation of the most significant factors causing the rate increase. Id. § 154.215(e)-
(0.
207. Id. § 154.215(i). This is subject to the Freedom of Information Act regulations. Id. §
154.215(h)(2).
208. A state has an effective rate review program for the small group and individual markets if
the state receives sufficient documentation to allow it to conduct a timely review. Id. § 154.210(a)-(b).
Such a review must include an assessment of the reasonableness of the insurer's assumptions, the
validity of the historical data underlying the assumptions, data related to past projections and actual
experience, the "impact of medical trend changes by major service categories," the "impact of
utilization changes by major service categories," the "impact of cost-sharing changes by major service
categories," the "impact of benefit changes," "changes in [the] enrollee risk profile," the impact of
over- or underestimates of medical trend in prior years, changes in reserve needs, "changes in
administrative costs related to programs that improve ... quality," the impact of changes in taxes,
licensing or regulatory fees, medical loss ratio, and capital and surplus. Id. § 154.301(a)(4). The
regulations set forth the factors that HHS will consider, with respect to each insurance market in the
state, in determining whether the state has an effective rate review program. Id. 3H 154.301(a),
154.210(a)-(b). The state must also conduct its review in accordance with standards set out in a state
statute or regulation, id. § 154.301(a)(5), provide web access to the preliminary justification, and
provide for public input, id. § 154.301(b). HHS can re-review the state's rate review program to
determine whether it has ceased to be effective. Id § 154.301(d).
209. See id. § 154.301(a)(1).
210. Id. § 154.301(a)(2). The regulations do not define "effective."
211. Id. § 154.301(a)(4).
212. Id. § 154.301(a)(2).
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this information available to the public213 and must report its final determination
as to whether a rate increase is unreasonable within five business days of its
determination. 2
14
If a state is deemed to have an effective program, only the state will review
filed rates and will do so using its own methods and standards of review. And,
the decision reached by the state regarding the reasonableness of the proposed
rates will be accepted by HHS. Oddly enough though, despite the extensive list
of data that states must review to have an "effective" review process, states are
not required to have the authority to actually deny proposed rate increases.
Thus, a state can have an "effective" rate review process even if it wholly lacks
any authority--or does not exercise the authority it has-to prevent the
implementation of a rate increase it finds unreasonable. In other words, the
"review" part of the state's rate review process must be sufficiently rigorous to
detect an unreasonable proposed rate, but the enforcement part can be
completely nonexistent. To have an "effective" process, states must look at, but
they do not have to touch, filed rates. Perhaps this is why HHS has deemed so
many states as possessing an "effective" rate review process. Currently, forty-five
states, the District of Columbia, and three U.S. territories (Guam, Puerto Rico,
and the U.S. Virgin Islands) are considered to have effective rate review in both
the individual and small group markets.
215
On the other hand, if the state does not have an effective rate review
program, HHS will conduct its own review to determine if the proposed rate
increase is unreasonable. 21 6 If HHS, rather than a state, reviews the proposed
rate increase, an additional set of rate-filing information must be provided to
HHS to permit a determination as to whether the request is unreasonable. A
proposed rate increase will be found "unreasonable" if it is "excessive,"
21 7
213. Id. § 154.301(b). The information must be made available on the state's website or CMS's
website and must include a process for receiving public comments on the proposed rate increases. Id.
§ 154.301(b)(1)(i)-(ii).
214. Id. § 154.210(b)(2).
215. State Approval of Health Insurance Rate Increases, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug.
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/health-insurance-rate-approval-disapproval.aspx. Indeed,
most states' rate review processes would have been considered "effective" under these standards even
before Congress enacted the ACA. In the preamble to the proposed rate review regulations, HHS
stated that "most States have existing effective rate review programs that would meet the
requirements of this regulation in substituting for HHS' review of rate filings that meet or exceed the
threshold" in one or both of the individual or small group markets. Rate Increase Disclosure and
Review Proposal, supra note 155, at 81203.
216. Alabama, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming are the only states deemed to have
ineffective rate review programs. State Effective Rate Review Programs, supra note 196. If a state lacks
the resources or authority to conduct rate reviews, HHS will conduct the reviews or partner with the
state to conduct the reviews. There are currently only five states where HHS will conduct rate reviews
and two states where HHS will partner with the states to conduct rate reviews. Id.
217. A rate increase is excessive if it "causes the premium charged for the health insurance
coverage to be unreasonably high in relation to the benefits provided under the coverage," based on
whether (1) it results in an MLR below the federal MLR standard in the relevant market, (2) any of its
assumptions are not supported by substantial evidence, and (3) "the choice ... or combination of
assumptions on which the rate increase is based is unreasonable." 45 C.F.R. § 154.205(b).
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"unjustified, ' ' 218 or "unfairly discriminatory" 219 -a review standard similar to
that widely applied by the states. If HHS determines that a proposed increase is
unreasonable, HHS will post its determination on its website. HHS does not,
however, have any authority to alter the rate or prohibit its implementation. If
an insurer decides to proceed with an unreasonable increase, it must submit a
final justification to HHS and post HHS's determination and its final justification
on its website. 220 Thus, HHS's main role in the rate review process is not to stop
unreasonable rates, but instead to subject those rates to public scrutiny. 221 In
essence, the ACA rate review process is an elaborate form of disclosure
regulation 222 designed to inform consumers and shame insurers into lowering
unreasonable rates. 22
3
B. The Results: Light, But Not Much Heat
In the first five years the ACA's rate review process was in effect, from 2011
to 2015, HHS estimated savings to consumers of about $4.7 billion dollars. 224
218. An increase is unjustified if the issuer provides data or documentation that is "incomplete,
inadequate or otherwise does not provide a basis upon which the reasonableness of an increase may be
determined." Id. § 154.205(c).
219. An increase is unfairly discriminatory if it "results in premium differences between
insureds within similar risk categories that: (1) [a]re not permissible under applicable State law; or (2)
[i]n the absence of an applicable State law, do not reasonably correspond to differences in expected
costs." Id. § 154.205(d).
220. Id. § 154.230(c)(1)-(2).
221. See Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Shining a Light on Health Insurance Rate
Increases, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Dec. 21, 2010),
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/ratereview.htmil. Furthermore, since
HHS cannot reject proposed increases and cannot compel states to do so either, the decision as to
whether an "unreasonable" rate increase will take effect rests on the authority (and desire) of the state
to block the rate increase. Thus, the rate review process for states that already possessed strong rate
review authority are largely unaffected by the ACA. Likewise, states with weak or no rate review
authority will also see little difference. Only in those states that have improved their processes in
response to the ACA will there be some effect. See generally SABRINA CORLETrE ET AL., URBAN
INST., CROss-CuTTING ISSUES: MONITORING STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT IN 10 STATES: RATE REVIEW (2012), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-
pdfs/412649-Monitoring-State-Implementation-of-the-Affordable-Care-Act-in-States-Rate-
Review.PDF (discussing the effect of state responses to the ACA in ten states).
222. For an overview and criticisms of disclosure regulation, see Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra
note 23, at 647.
223. Professor Timothy Jost has noted,
This disclosure requirement is the key to the regulation. Although the statute does not
authorize HHS to reject proposed rate increases, Congress determined that public disclosure
of information supporting rate increases would invite public scrutiny of rate increase
proposals and might have a "sentinel effect," deterring unreasonable requests. In a number
of instances in the past year, insurers have had rate increases rejected or have withdrawn
proposed rate increases in the face of public criticism of the proposed increases.
Jost, Implementing Health Reform, supra note 200. For a brief history of regulation by shaming and its
shortcomings, see Mary Graham, Regulation by Shaming, ATLANTIC, Apr. 2000, at 36,36-40.
224. See 2015 RATE REvIEw REPORT, supra note 8, at 2 (estimating $1.1 billion saved in the
individual market and $418 million in the small group market in 2015); 2014 RATE REVIEW REPORT,
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From a strictly "green eyeshade" point of view, the federal investment in rate
review appears to have paid off. For its $250 million investment in grants to the
states (plus its own administrative costs), 225 the return on investment seems
significant. From the perspective of an individual consumer, however, the results
are not nearly as impressive.
While the aggregate savings reported by HHS appear shockingly large,
actual savings to consumers were much less electrifying. For example, the HHS
annual rate review report for calendar year 2013 states that rate review reduced
total premiums nationwide in the individual market by an estimated $290 million
and the average requested rate increase was reduced by 8%.226 In the small
group market, rate review reduced total premiums nationwide by an estimated
$703 million and the average requested rate increase was reduced by 11%.227
While total savings approaching a billion dollars may appear impressive, a closer
look reveals that the rate review process put very little back in the pockets of
consumers.
First, even after rate review, the average rate increase actually approved
and implemented in individual markets in 2013 was still quite high-10.3%-
only a small reduction from the 11.2% average rate increase originally requested
by insurers. 228 The average approved rate increase of 10.3% not only exceeded
the 10% threshold figure that HHS established as a presumptively unreasonable
rate of increase, but was also nearly seven times the U.S. rate of inflation in 2013,
which was 1.5%.229 In the small group market, the numbers were not much
better. Rate review reduced the average requested rate increase from 8% to
7.1%,230 which was still nearly five times the U.S. rate of inflation.
Second, actual savings to consumers were quite small. The total savings
resulting from rate review in the individual market equaled less than 1% of total
supra note 8, at 2 (estimating $290 million saved in the individual market and $703 million in the small
group market in 2013); 2013 RATE REVIEW REPORT, supra note 8, at 5 figs.1-2 (estimating $311
million saved in individual market and $866 million in the small group market in 2012); 2012 Rate
Review Report, supra note 8 (estimating $425 million saved in individual market and $600 million in
the small group market in 2011). HHS did not estimate savings for the individual or small group
markets for 2014 due to the implementation of new market rules that year. 2015 RATE REVIEW
REPORT, supra note 8, at 5.
225. See supra note 196 and accompanying text for reference to the ACA's method of achieving
this investment.
226. 2014 RATE REVIEW REPORT, supra note 8, at 2. The reduction in average requested rate
increase in the individual market applied was based on the forty states for which HHS had data. Id. at
4.
227. Id. at 5. The reduction in average requested rate increase in the small group market applied
was based on the thirty-seven states for which HHS had data. Id. at 2.
228. Id. at 3.
229. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIsTICS, CPI DETAILED REPORT: DATA FOR DECEMBER
2013, at 1 tbl.A (Malik Crawford & Jonathan Church eds., 2014), http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid1312.pdf
(listing the unadjusted change to the CPI-U (consumer price index-urban) for the twelve month period
ending December 2013).
230. 2014 RATE REVIEW REPORT, supra note 8, at 5.
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premium,231 and resulted in average savings of just over $9 per month per
covered life for approximately one-quarter of those in the individual market.
232
Rates for the remaining three-quarters of the individual market were unaffected
by rate review and those insureds saw no reduction in proposed rate increases. 233
Savings in the small group market also equaled less than 1% of total premium.
234
Average savings were just over $16 per month per covered life for approximately
one-fifth of those in the small group market. 235 Similar to the individual market,
rates for the remaining four-fifths of the small group market were unaffected by
rate review. 236 And while an average of $16 per month is not an insignificant
amount, the impact of these savings was moderated by the fact that these
estimated savings would, in most cases, have been shared by both employers and
the employees, since both typically contribute to health insurance premiums.1
37
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is not clear how much of these
savings are actually attributable to rate review processes that were already in
place prior to enactment of the ACA. At least some states reduced proposed
rate increases in the small group and individual markets prior to enactment of
the ACA, but there is no data on the estimated savings from those pre-ACA rate
review reductions against which the post-ACA rate review estimated savings can
be directly compared. 238 While we can be sure that some amount of the nearly
231. Total premium in the individual market in 2013 was $32.3 billion. Two hundred ninety
million dollars, the estimated amount saved by rate review, translates to only 0.9% of total premium in
the individual market. Id at 4 tbl.1.
232. This figure results from dividing $290 million (the estimated total savings) by 2.6 million
(the total number of lives affected by the rate reductions), and then further dividing by twelve to get
the monthly savings of $9.26. Id.
233. Only 2.6 million of the 10.9 covered lives in the individual market realized any savings as a
result of rate review. Id. If spread over the entire individual market, savings resulting from rate review
equal only $2.22 per month.
234. Total premium in the small group market in 2013 was $78.2 billion. Seven hundred and
three million dollars, the estimated amount saved by rate review, represents 0.9% of total premium.
Id. at 6 tbl.2.
235. This figure results from dividing $703 million (the estimated total savings) by 3.6 million
(the total number of lives affected by the rate reductions), and then further dividing by twelve to get
the monthly savings of $9.26. Id.
236. Only 3.6 million of the 17.3 million covered lives in the small group market realized any
savings as a result of rate review. Id. at 6. If spread over the entire small group market, savings
resulting from rate review equal only $3.39 per month.
237. The 2015 rate review report shows roughly similar results to those obtained in 2013. The
average rate increase actually approved and implemented for renewing plans in individual markets in
2015 was 6.9%, a small reduction from the 8.7% average rate increase originally sought. See 2015
RATE REVIEW REPORT, supra note 8, at 7. The average rate increase approved for renewing plans in
the small group market in 2015 was 4.3%, also a slight reduction from the 5.1% average rate increase
sought. Id. While the rate increases sought in 2015 were lower than those sought in 2013, the overall
rate of inflation in 2015 was also lower than in 2013. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CPI
DETAILED REPORT: DATA FOR DECEMBER 2015, at 1 tbl.A (Malik Crawford, Jonathan Church &
Bradley Akin eds., 2015), http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid1512.pdf (listing the unadjusted change to the
CPI-U for the twelve month period ending December 2015 as 0.7%). The rate of inflation in 2013 was
1.5%. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
238. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., QUANTIFYING THE EFFECTS OF HEALTH INSURANCE RATE
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$4.7 billion dollars of estimated rate review savings from 2011 to 2015 would
have occurred even without the ACA's rate review process, we cannot know
how much.
IV. THE LIMrrs OF RATE REVIEW UNDER THE ACA
The ACA's rate review process was part of a larger package of reforms
designed to address a host of defects in the private insurance market. Yet, the
ACA's changes to rate review have neither substantially reduced premium
increases nor markedly increased consumer savings. But it would be a mistake to
assume the ACA's rate review shortcomings are limited to its lack of
enforcement authority. Rate review's defects are more elemental. Even if the
federal government and the states had the authority and the willpower to more
aggressively clamp down on rates deemed to be unreasonable under the ACA's
review standard, consumers would still see little change in what they pay for
health coverage for three reasons. First, rate review does nothing to address the
forces that drive up the medical cost component of health insurance rates-
typically the largest contributor to rate increases. Moreover, while the rate
review process that developed a hundred years ago may have been appropriate
for fire insurance rates at that time, it is not effective for the current health
insurance market, which has shifted from an indemnity model to a direct
reimbursement model. Health insurers now directly participate in the setting of
prices for healthcare services by paying providers directly. Despite health
insurers' substantial involvement in medical price-setting, this aspect of insurer
behavior is not reached by the rate review process. Thus, the single largest
contributor to premium increases is unaffected by the rate review process.
Second, another provision of the ACA-the MLR cap-pressures insurers to
lower the loading charges included in their rates, dampening the potential
benefits of rate review. Finally, rate review under the ACA applies to only 16%
of the overall health insurance market, thereby severely circumscribing any
beneficial effects of rate review for the overall health insurance market.
A. Rate Review, Indemnity Insurance, and Direct Payment to Providers
Rate review can have only a small effect on health insurance premiums for
one simple reason: the current rate review process does not give regulators the
right tools to do the job. The ACA's rate review process, which is based on
property-casualty rate review, is limited to reviewing only certain factors
affecting the rate, mainly the reliability of claims data, the appropriateness of
actuarial assumptions based on those data, the level of profits and administrative
costs included in the rate, and mathematical calculations. This type of limited
rate review was appropriate for fire insurance rates a century ago when
insurance regulators were concerned with both inadequate rates due to reckless
REVIEW 6 (2012), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.fdes.wordpress.com/2013/01/8376.pdf ("Because many
states had some form of review process in effect prior to the September 1, 2011 implementation of the
ACA's rate review standards, the reduction in requested rate increases as a result of rate review
cannot be attributed fully to the ACA.").
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competition and price gouging due to cartel pricing. Nineteenth-century rate
review was unconcerned with the underlying prices of goods and services that
affected claims costs because those prices were not affected by insurer conduct.
Fire insurance rates were not volatile because of the underlying costs of building
materials and labor, but because of insurer behavior-specifically, charging
inadequate premiums and engaging in collusive price-setting. Since the ACA
follows the property-casualty approach to rate review, health insurance rate
review is also unconcerned with the underlying prices of goods and services that
affect healthcare claims costs. As a result, ACA rate review simply accepts
healthcare provider price increases and ensures that those price increases are
fully incorporated into insurance rates.
If modern health insurance still operated on an indemnity basis, like
property-casualty insurance, and if health insurers were engaging in haphazard
or discriminatory ratemaking, the ACA rate review process would be a
reasonable regulatory strategy for ensuring appropriate rates. However, modern
health insurance no longer adheres to the indemnity model of insurance. Instead,
insurers have a direct role in setting the prices paid for healthcare goods and
services-a role that regulators are powerless to scrutinize during the rate review
process. To understand the role insurers play in setting prices, it is important to
understand (1) the differences between indemnity and direct provider payment
models, (2) the health insurance industry's shift from the indemnity to the direct
provider payment model, and (3) how the shift to the direct provider payment
model has contributed to rising medical costs.
1. Two Models of Insurance: Indemnity vs. Direct Provider Payment
The key to understanding the shortcomings of the ACA's expanded rate
review process can be found in the difference between two fundamentally
different models of insurance: the indemnity model (the form of insurance upon
which rate review is based), and the direct provider payment model (the form of
insurance currently embraced by the health insurance industry). These two
models involve fundamentally different roles for the insurer in the direct
development of underlying claims costs, and therefore insurance rates.
Indemnity insurance, the model for property-casualty insurance, involves a
two-party relationship. 239 Under the indemnity model, the insurer and the
insured enter into a contract to cover specified risks. If there is a covered loss,
the insurer makes a payment to the insured (for first-party insurance) or
someone other than the insured who has suffered a loss (for third-party
insurance). 240 Indemnity insurers generally have no preexisting, direct financial
relationship with a third party making a claim under an insurance policy.241
239. This is true regardless of whether the insurance coverage is first party or third party. First-
party insurance covers claims of the insured. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 14, at 183. Third-
party insurance covers claims by a third party against the insured. Id.
240. In the case of third-party insurance, losses are paid as the result of a settlement or court
judgment of a claim arising between the injured third party and the insurer.
241. For a description of indemnity insurance, see EMMETr J. VAUGHAN & THERESE M.
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Claims are paid to a third party according to the terms of the policy between the
insurer and the insured. Data from claims payments, as well as various other data
collected by an insurer, such as the physical location of the insured property and
its market value, can be used to calculate insurance rates. 242 Prior to the 1980s,
health insurers largely used the indemnity insurance model. 243 The health
insurance contract was a two-party arrangement between the insured (or an
employer in the case of employer-based coverage) and the insurer. Insurers
reimbursed insureds directly for incurred medical costs and did not contract with
healthcare providers or set the prices paid to providers. 244 In this respect, health
insurers and property-casualty insurers used the same indemnity insurance
model. Health insurers did not participate in the setting of physician or hospital
prices, just as automobile insurers did not participate in the setting of prices for
automobile parts or labor rates for repair shops. For indemnity insurance, the
rate review process assumes no insurer control over underlying claims costs and
properly treats the insurer as a "pass-through" entity for the purposes of those
costs.
2. Modern Health Insurance and the Direct Provider Payment Model
From the early 1960s through the mid-1970s medical care costs-and thus
health insurance rates-had been increasing rapidly, 245 and insurers were
looking for ways to control those costs. BCBS plans paid for hospital care on the
basis of allowable costs, and commercial health insurers paid a percentage of
billed charges, typically 75% to 80%.246 This form of payment discouraged price
competition among hospitals, since every service that generated a cost could be
billed and therefore generate revenue. 247 The lack of price competition not only
led to higher hospital prices generally, it also had the unusual effect of driving up
prices in geographic areas that had more hospitals. In other words, high prices
went hand in hand with high numbers of hospitals. 248 In the absence of price
VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 166-67 (11th ed. 2014).
242. See id. at 132-37 (describing various informational components used to develop a
premium).
243. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 258-60, 291-92
(1982). BCBS plans were the exception to this approach. Blue Cross plans typically reimbursed
hospitals directly. See ROBERT D. EILERS, REGULATION OF BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD PLANS 87
(1963). A minority of Blue Shield organizations were pure indemnity insurers. Id. (noting that in the
late 1950s only 21% of Blue Shield organizations were indemnity-type plans while the rest were direct
payment service plans or a combination of direct payment and indemnity plans).
244. STARR, supra note 243, at 291.
245. Although increases in the cost of medical care are often attributed to the Medicare and
Medicaid programs, which were enacted in 1965, the main driver of costs was the fee-for-service,
reasonable cost payment system. Id. at 385.
246. Marjorie Smith Carroll & Ross H. Arnett III, Private Health Insurance Plans in 1978 and
1979: A Review of Coverage, Enrollment, and Financial Experience, 3 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 55, 65
(1981) (noting that commercial insurance plans offering major medical coverage usually paid 75% to
80% of the costs of medical care).
247. MICHAEL A. MORRISEY, HEALTH INSURANCE 175-76 (2d ed. 2014).
248. Id.
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competition, hospitals incurred greater costs by competing on nonprice factors
such as new equipment, expanded services, and fancier amenities.
249
The response of the health insurance industry was to try to control costs
through managed care techniques,250 including through the use of selective
contracting with providers. Selective contracting allowed insurers to negotiate
lower prices from providers. 25 1 This was the genesis of limited provider networks
and the direct provider payment model. As a result, most health insurers shifted
away from the pure indemnity model.252 Insurers instead negotiated, contracted
with, and paid medical care providers directly, becoming direct financers of
medical care providers. 253 While the limited network cost-control strategy
worked initially, it began to backfire after only a few years.
Although limited networks helped hold down the growth of medical care
costs through the mid-1990s, healthcare costs-and health insurance premiums-
began to grow rapidly in the mid-1990s, with health insurance premiums
reaching annual increases of 8% to 14%. 254 One major reason for the increase
was provider consolidation. Provider consolidation thwarts selective contracting
by limiting insurers' ability to exclude some providers from their networks,
particularly those providers that have a large enough share of an insurer's book
of business. 255 Empirical evidence suggests that providers may have responded
to selective contracting by consolidating. Beginning in the mid-1990s, provider
consolidation increased, especially among hospitals, 25 6 affording providers
greater market power and the ability to command higher prices from the insurers
with whom they contracted. As discussed earlier in Section I, the high prices
charged by providers are the main drivers of skyrocketing health insurance
249. Id.; see also James C. Robinson & Harold S. Luft, Competition and Cost of Hospital Care,
1972 to 1982, 257 JAMA 3241, 3243-44 (1987).
250. For a brief overview of the growth of managed care, see Peter D. Fox & Peter R.
Kongstvedt, A History of Managed Health Care and Health Insurance in the United States, in
ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE 3,3-20 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 6th ed. 2013).
251. David M. Cutler et al., How Does Managed Care Do It?, 31 RAND J. ECON. 526, 528
(2000) (noting that in the 1990s health insurers offered managed care plans that employed supply-side
managed care techniques, including the development of networks of favored physicians and hospitals
with whom plans bargained hard for low rates).
252. See Fox & Kongstvedt, supra note 250, at 10 (noting that in the mid-1980s traditional
indemnity health insurance accounted for 75% of the commercial market, but declined to the single
digits by the year 2000 because it had been replaced by managed care).
253. See Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform: What's Insurance Got to Do with It? Recognizing
Health Insurance as a Separate Species of Insurance, 36 AM. J. L. & MED. 436, 441 (2010) ("The health
insurance industry in the United States is already far down the path toward becoming primarily a
health care payer, and only secondarily an insurer of health risks.").
254. See MORRISEY, supra note 247, at 197.
255. Limited-provider networks can hold down provider prices only under certain conditions:
there must be a large number of providers, those providers must have excess capacity, and none of the
providers can have a significant share of the insurer's business. Id. at 201.
256. ROBERT MURRAY & SUZANNE F. DELBANCO, CATALYST FOR PAYMENT REFORM,
PROVIDER MARKET POWER IN THE U.S. HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY: ASSESSING ITS IMPACT AND
LOOKING AHEAD 16-18 (2012), http:llwww.catalyzepaymentreform.orglimagesldocuments/Market
_Power.pdf.
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premiums. And, as also discussed in Section I, a host of market failures ensure
that the consumers who purchase healthcare goods and services through health
insurance cannot effectively control healthcare prices. The result is escalating
health insurance rates: as provider prices escalate, the medical cost component of
health insurance rates increase.
Unsurprisingly, because the rate review process does nothing to address the
underlying cost drivers of medical care, rate review cannot control the medical
cost component of health insurance beyond identifying mathematical errors and
faulty actuarial assumptions. Rate review can, however, address the loading
charge portion of a rate since items such as administrative costs and profits are
within the control of the insurer. But one provision of the ACA-the MLR
requirement-limits the effectiveness of rate review with respect to the loading
charge.
B. Control of the Loading Charge
Although rate review is capable of holding insurer profits and
administrative costs in check, the ACA's MLR requirement imposes a hard cap
on the total amount of administrative costs that can be included in an insurer's
rates. Health insurers in the individual and small group markets are prohibited
from allocating more than 20% of premium to profits and administrative costs
(an MLR of 80%). 25' Insurers in the large group market are prohibited from
allocating more than 15% of premium to profits and administrative costs (an
MLR of 85%).258 The requirement is enforced through a retrospective
accounting and rebate system. An insurer that fails to meet this requirement for
a given market must rebate to each of its insureds (or the employer in the case of
group coverage) the amount of the difference on a pro rata basis. 259 In this
respect, the MLR requirement works as a retrospective rate-setting mechanism.
While the MLR requirement can result in a rebate, the principal function of
the MLR requirement is to encourage insurers to calculate rates consistent with
the MLR limits in the first place. In other words, the MLR requirement creates
pressure on insurers to keep loading charges within the established limits. There
is evidence that insurers are indeed lowering administrative costs during the
ratemaking process, that is, before rates are submitted for rate review. After the
implementation of the MLR requirement, the amount of rebates and the number
of insureds covered by the rebates have both declined. Rebates have declined
dramatically from $1.1 billion paid to 12.8 million insureds for premiums paid in
2011260 to $332 million paid to 6.8 million consumers for 2013.261 This means that
257. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
258. Id. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A)(i).
259. Id. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A).
260. Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, The 80/20 Rule: Providing Value and Rebates to
Millions of Consumers, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (June 21, 2012),
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Forms-Reports-and-Other-Resources/mlir-rebatesO6212012a.
html.
261. See CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CONSUMERS BENEFITED FROM 80/20
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the loading charges included in rates have fallen dramatically, giving insurance
regulators fewer opportunities to reduce loading charges during the rate review
process. 262
C. The Limited Scope of Rate Review
The third factor confounding the effectiveness of the ACA's rate review
process is the limited scope of the review process itself. As noted earlier, the
ACA's rate review provisions are applicable to only the small and individual
group markets, 263 the smallest segments of the private health insurance market.
Large group, self-funded, and grandfathered plans are not covered. This means
that less than one-sixth of those covered by the U.S. private health insurance
market have coverage affected by the ACA's rate review provisions. 264 Thus,
whatever benefits are to be derived from the ACA's rate review process, those
benefits accrue to only a very small portion of the private health insurance
market and leave most of the health insurance market unaffected.
V. A NEW ROLE FOR RATE REVIEW?
As the preceding sections have demonstrated, there are a host of reasons
why the current health insurance rate review process is not a terribly effective
method for controlling health insurance rate increases: rate review applies to
only a small portion of the health insurance market, the ACA does not require
the federal government or the states to reject unreasonable rates when found,
the ACA's MLR cap dampens the effect of rate review on a rate's loading
charge, and, most importantly, health insurance rate review is modeled on an
RULE IN 2013, at 2 fig.2 (2014), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Forms-Reports-and-Other-
Resources/Downloads/Final-MLR-Report..07-22-2014.pdf.
262. This does not mean that states cannot enforce the MLR requirement at the rate review
stage. Indeed, a handful of states do so. Karaca-Mandic et al., supra note 24, at 1363 (noting that in
2013 eight states employed a rate review system for individual market products that required a
minimum loss ratio of 80% or more as a condition for approval of filed rates). These eight states had
moderately lower rates than states that did not require a high (80% or more) MLR as a condition of
approval. Id. at 1365. This important study suggests that a rate review process in the individual market
that aggressively enforces the MLR requirement prospectively (before rates are approved), rather
than retrospectively (at the end of the year), can yield lower rates. While the benefits to consumers of
a strict, prospective MLR rate review requirement should not be minimized, it is important to
emphasize two points. First, even this aggressive rate review does nothing to address the underlying
medical costs that are the major drivers of health insurance rate increases. Thus, 80% of the rate
remains untouched by this aggressive rate review process. Second, the study does not consider the
substantial retrospective MILR refunds-over $1 billion-that were made to policyholders in the
individual market during the study period, 2010 to 2013. See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying
text for a summary of the amounts paid.
263. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the ACA's rate
review provisions and their exemptions.
264. About 201 million Americans were covered by private health insurance in 2013. JESSICA C.
SMITH & CARLA MEDALIA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES:
2013, 2 fig.1 (2014), http://www.census.gov/content/damlCensusllibrary/publications/2014/demo/p60.
250.pdf. Only 28 million of those received health insurance in the small group and individual markets.
See supra Part II.B..b-c.
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inapplicable property-casualty model that cannot address the underlying medical
costs that drive up the cost of health insurance. Undeniably, casting a bright light
on these shortcomings may cause some to condemn the rate review process as
little more than a toothless, unimaginative, and ineffective expansion of a
congenitally weak state-based rate review process. But such criticism would be
too harsh. Rate review is not inherently incapable of holding down the
underlying costs of medical care, rather it simply is not employed as effectively
as it could be. This is rate review's greatest sin, the sin of omission. 265 Rate
review's soupqon of rate oversight could indeed be enhanced and transformed
into a powerful tool to combat skyrocketing health insurance rates, but only if it
is modernized in a way that enables it to address current failures in the health
insurance market.
A. Rate Review as a Cost Control Mechanism
Before specifically addressing the use of rate review as a cost control
mechanism, there is the preliminary question of whether we really need another
cost control device. There is no shortage of cost control policy prescriptions;
indeed, we are awash in "remedies" for the high cost of medical care, including,
but not limited to, health maintenance organizations, managed care, capitated
payments, integrated delivery systems, health savings accounts, consumer-
directed health plans, pay for performance, health information technology,
comparative effectiveness research, bundled payments, patient-centered medical
homes, and value-based purchasing. 266 All of these approaches, however, possess
the same flaw: they do nothing to remedy the system-wide problem of excessive
provider prices. Instead, these approaches view the cost problem largely as a
function of excessive or inefficient individual medical encounters, informational
deficits, or care coordination difficulties. As a result, health insurance rates have
continued their steady climb skyward. What is needed is a mechanism to address
the market failures that lead to excessive provider prices.
But why use rate review to address these market failures? If excess prices
are really the problem, why not simply create a price-setting commission, like the
one currently used by Maryland to set hospital prices? 267 There are practical,
theoretical, and political reasons for favoring a rate review approach to
addressing the problem of spiraling healthcare prices.
265. See James 4:17 (New American Standard Bible) ("[T]o the one who knows the right thing
to do and does not do it, to him it is sin.").
266. Theodore Marmor & Jonathan Oberlander, From HMOs to ACOs: The Quest for the Holy
Grail in U.S. Health Policy, 27 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1215, 1215-17 (2012) (decrying these and other
approaches to cost control as "fads" that do little to address the cost problem on a system-wide basis).
267. The most commonly proposed price control mechanism is the establishment of an all-payer
price-setting commission (similar to Maryland's system), or a private payer price-setting commission
like the one used in West Virginia. For a brief overview of the Maryland and West Virginia price-
setting systems, see Sommers et al., supra note 95, at 2-5.
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1. Practical Reasons for Using Rate Review
There are compelling practical reasons for employing a new rate review
process to address market failures that lead to excessive provider prices. First,
the new rate review process would be flexible and dynamic. Not only could it be
employed to address the problems afflicting a specific market, it could also be
adapted to address changes in market conditions. Second, rate review could
make use of existing infrastructure and expertise.
a. Rate Review Is Flexible
Flexibility is the most compelling practical reason to adopt a new rate
review process as a means to address excessive provider prices. Unlike strict
price-setting, which appears to be gaining favor among many health policy
scholars and economists, 268 the rate review process is capable of employing
myriad innovative and flexible tools for addressing health insurance market
failures. As discussed more fully below, the rate review process can be used in a
range of ways, from promoting greater price competition among providers to
directly regulating provider payment rates, depending on the needs and
conditions of the local market. This flexibility is important because not all states
suffer from the same level of provider consolidation and market power. For
example, in the Minneapolis-Saint Paul area, there is greater competition among
hospital systems, leading to low health insurance premiums. In contrast, just over
the border in Wisconsin, with different provider networks and insurers, a health
plan with similar benefits could cost three times as much as one available in
Minneapolis-Saint Paul. 269 Given these differences, the same one-size-fits-all
price-setting approach may not be optimal for both markets.
The flexibility of addressing market failure through rate review also means
that local polices can be adapted to changing conditions. Rather than focusing on
setting a price, a rate review approach would focus on a broader goal: lowering
the cost of health insurance. Over time it can, therefore, adopt new, more
flexible approaches to cost control. In contrast, once a static and fixed
administrative structure for price-setting is established (i.e., a rate-setting
agency), its process could become institutionalized and self-perpetuating, 270
leading to policy stagnation that could blunt the development of competition-
enhancing products or new, innovative payment systems.271
268. See supra note 94 and accompanying text for a survey of scholars who opine that price-
setting is a viable solution.
269. Jordan Rau, The 10 Least Expensive Health Insurance Markets in the U.S., KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 13, 2014), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/10-least-expensive-health-insurance-
markets-in-us/.
270. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, 41 PUB. INTEREST 77, 93
(1975) (noting the potential for "self-perpetuating" agencies, that is, the creation of agencies that
produce "a set of political relationships that make exceptionally difficult further alteration of that
program").
271. See William M. Sage, Getting the Product Right: How Competition Policy Can Improve
Health Care Markets, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1076, 1081-82 (2014) (arguing that focusing on market
concentration and prices alone does not alter the fact that that the modem provision of healthcare has
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b. Existing Infrastructure and Expertise
A rate review approach would also make use of existing infrastructure and
expertise. Every state already has its own insurance department, with its own
expert staff, that closely oversees and regulates its own domestic health insurers.
Establishing yet another state agency-a stand-alone rate-setting bureaucracy-
would not only be costly, time consuming, and potentially subject to protracted
political debate, it would also layer yet another bureaucratic agency onto an
already overburdened healthcare sector.
2 72
Insurance departments already have staffs with knowledge of the prevailing
market climate, the financial condition of health insurers, the major drivers of
health insurance rate increases, and the market power of providers.
Furthermore, insurance departments have the tools necessary to fully evaluate
market conditions. Insurance departments have broad authority to undertake, at
the expense of the insurance industry, in-depth examinations of each insurer's
operations to ensure that insurers offer reasonably priced products and operate
in a manner that is fair to consumers. 273 These examinations, called "market
conduct examinations" 274 could be used to evaluate the payment contracts
between insurers and healthcare providers, 275 with the costs of such
examinations borne by insurers. 27 6 Thus, insurance departments already have
significant authority, expertise, and the capacity to make determinations about
how best to address market defects that affect health insurance prices.
become a series of process steps that can be billed for rather than assembled).
272. States are already awash in administrative agencies that regulate and/or oversee their
healthcare sectors. For instance, in Connecticut, there are numerous state agencies, including the
Office of Health Care Access, Office of the Healthcare Advocate, Commission on Health Equity,
Department of Insurance, Department of Public Health, Department of Social Services, Connecticut
Health and Educational Facilities Authority, Connecticut Health Insurance Exchange, and the Health
Information Technology Exchange of Connecticut, which regulate or oversee various aspects of the
state's healthcare and health insurance industries. See Departments and Agencies, CT.GOV,
http://portal.ct.gov/Department-and-Agencies/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
273. See HEALTH MGMT. Assocs., STRENGTHENING THE VALUE AND PERFORMANCE OF
HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET CONDUCT EXAMINATION PROGRAMS: CONSUMER
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATORS AND LAWMAKERS 7 (2013), http://www.naic.org/documents/
committeesconliaisonrelated health_mce.pdf.
274. Id. For an example of a state insurance department's market conduct examination
authority, see 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 27-13.1-1 to -8 (West 2016).
275. See, e.g., Care New England Health Sys. v. R.I. Office of the Health Ins. Comm'r, C.A. No.
PC 10-6984, slip op. at 14-15 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2011), https://www.courts.ri.gov/
Courts/DecisionsOrders/decisions/10-6984.pdf (finding that health insurance commissioner
appropriately used market conduct authority to investigate payment contract between insurer and
hospital).
276. See, e.g., 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-13.1-7(a) ("The total cost of the examinations shall be
borne by the examined companies....").
2016]
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
2. Theoretical Reasons for Using Rate Review
Two aspects of federalism, state innovation and interstate competition,
provide theoretical reasons for adopting a new rate review process.
a. States as Laboratories of Innovation
First, using rate review to address market failure could lead to the kind of
state-based policy innovation that is one of the hallmarks of federalism. Perhaps
the most widely cited value of federalism is the notion that states, functioning as
"laboratories of democracy," promote the development and testing of policy
innovations that might not otherwise be pursued at the federal level. 277 The idea
was most famously and compellingly expressed by Justices Holmes 278 and
Brandeis 279 nearly a hundred years ago. Indeed, "Brandeis's exegesis of the
argument for experimentation"' 280 that "a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country, ' 281 is now "part of the
federalistic catechism. '282 And, the expected benefits of experimentation can
transcend the borders of the experimenting state. As states employ their own
policy experiments, a wide range of potential policy solutions could potentially
277. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (recognizing that federalism "allows for
more innovation and experimentation in government"); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787-88 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[T]he Court's decision undermines the most valuable aspects of our federalism. Courts and
commentators frequently have recognized that the 50 States serve as laboratories for the development
of new social, economic, and political ideas."); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1,
49-50 (1973) (identifying experimentation as a benefit of local control); Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 528-30 (1995) (noting that the "states as laboratories"
argument is frequently cited in support of federalism); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating
the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1498 (1987) (arguing that federalism creates
competition that fosters innovation in governmental functions); David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing
Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and
the Administrative State, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1197, 1225 (2004) ("The 'experimentation' rationale holds
that multiple jurisdictions function as 'laboratories of democracy' and thereby allow for limited,
exploratory testing of policy innovations that cannot be safely pursued at the federal level."); Harry N.
Scheiber, Foreword: The Direct Ballot and State Constitutionalism, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 787, 805 (1997)
(noting that "the idea of the states as 'laboratories' has endured and attracted the attention,
approvingly or otherwise, from commentators and political actors on all points in the political
spectrum").
278. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Scheiber,
supra note 277, at 804-05 (noting that more than a decade before Brandeis's famous statement in New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, "Holmes had pointed the way for this kind of argument in commending
federalism for allowing states to be 'insulated chambers' in which legislative experimentation could be
implemented with relatively little danger to other states of the Union or the welfare of the national
citizenry generally").
279. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
280. Scheiber, supra note 277, at 804.
281. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311.
282. Scheiber, supra note 277, at 804-05.
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emerge to address problems common to all states. 283 States, or even the federal
government, could learn from or adopt another state's innovative approach.
284
Probably the best-known example of successful state experimentation in
healthcare is the 2006 Massachusetts health insurance mandate, which served as
a model for the ACA's individual mandate.
2 85
b. Interstate Competition
Interstate competition is another federalism-based reason for states to
adopt a more robust rate review process. The competition between states to
attract mobile citizens and businesses that can "vote with their feet," or exit one
state for another, provides a strong motivation for policy action. 286 In addition,
interstate competition makes states more responsive to their own citizens in
order to keep those citizens from leaving. 287 A new rate review process that
addresses market failures that drive up the cost of health insurance could not
only help lure employers from other states (by lowering their health insurance
costs), but could also help a state retain businesses for the same reason.
3. Political Reasons for Using Rate Review
Finally, there are significant political reasons favoring a new state-based
rate review process. First, the federal government is unlikely to enact any
significant new legislation enhancing federal oversight over health insurance
anytime soon. The legal and political aftershocks of the ACA continue to
reverberate, and opponents of the ACA continue their fight to repeal the
ACA.288 Second, federal deference to state regulation of insurance, including
283. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he
States may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where
the best solution is far from clear."). As more states experiment, more policy solutions are likely to be
tried. See McConnell, supra note 277, at 1498 ("Lower levels of government are more likely to depart
from established consensus .... Elementary statistical theory holds that a greater number of
independent observations will produce more instances of deviation from the mean.").
284. See PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 17-19, 25-26,46-47 (1995) (discussing
the differing approaches used by state and federal governments); Paul E. Peterson & Daniel Nadler,
Freedom to Fail: The Keystone of American Federalism, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 251,255 (2012).
285. Jennifer B. Wriggins, Mandates, Markets, and Risk: Auto Insurance and the Affordable
Care Act, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 275, 284 (2013) (noting that the ACA's individual mandate was modeled
on Massachusetts's individual mandate law). Another example is Medicare's adoption of the
diagnoses-related group payment system that was first pioneered by New Jersey. See Law &
Ensminger, supra note 132, at 3, 3-4 n.15.
286. See generally Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956) (discussing the policy implications that attend this competition).
287. John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights: A Defense of Judicial
Review in a Federal System, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 89, 107-08 (2004) ("Citizens dissatisfied with state
policy not only have the option of lobbying for change, but also of moving to another state that
deliberately seeks to attract them with more favorable policies. To the benefits of political voice
provided by interstate diversity, the possibility of interstate competition adds those of exit.").
288. See, e.g., Noam N. Levey, House Republicans Vote to Repeal Obamacare, Again, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015, 9:52 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-obamacare-repeal-house-
20151023-story.html (noting the 240-to-189 House of Representatives vote to repeal major portions of
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health insurance regulation, has been, 289 and continues to be, the dominant
organizing principle of federal insurance legislation. Even the ACA, which in
some ways appears to be a federal takeover of health insurance regulation, still
goes to great lengths to preserve traditional state-based regulation of health
insurance, as evidenced by state-based exchanges, 290 deference to state
determinations of required health benefits in plans offered on exchanges, 2
91
overwhelming deference to state-based rate review processes, 292 and many other
aspects of the ACA.2 93
B. A New Rate Review Process
Before turning to the mechanics of the new rate review process, there are
two steps a state must take before it can use rate review to address the market
failures that drive up provider prices. First, rate review must be expanded to
cover all fully insured markets. This means rate review should be applied to large
group market rates in the same way it is now applied to individual and small
group market rates.294 This expansion would not only ensure the influence of the
new rate review process over the entire fully insured market, it would also
ensure a spillover effect on the ERISA self-funded market. Insurers that
administer ERISA self-funded plans do not negotiate separate payment
contracts with each provider, one for the insurer's fully insured plans and
another for the insurer's self-funded plans. Insurers use the same contract for
both types of plans. 295 Thus, to the extent that the new rate review process
obligates insurers to take actions to correct for market failures and those actions
are incorporated into provider contracts, those corrective actions would apply
with equal force to fully insured and self-funded plans. 296
Second, the new rate review process would have to be based on a new
the ACA, including the requirement that Americans obtain health insurance).
289. See Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. Hall, The Role of State Regulation in Consumer-Driven
Health Care, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 397 (2005) (tracing federal deference to state insurance
regulation from the Supreme Court's decision in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868), to the inclusion
of ERISA's "savings clause," which exempts from preemption state laws that regulate insurance).
290. See Alice Noble & Mary Ann Chirba, Individual and Group Coverage Under the ACA:
More Patches to the Federal-State Crazy Quilt, HEALTH AFF. BLOO (Jan. 17, 2013), http://health
affairs.org/blog/2013/01/17/individual-and-group-coverage-under-the-aca-more-patches-to-the-federal-
state-crazy-quilt/ (noting that the ACA "seeks to preserve and even enhances" the traditional role of
the states in regulating health insurance).
291. See id. (noting that states can determine their own required benefits for health plans sold
on exchanges).
292. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the wide deference the ADA affords state-based
rate review processes.
293. See Brendan S. Maher & Radha A. Pathak, Enough About the Constitution: How States
Can Regulate Health Insurance Under the ACA, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 275, 291-306 (2013)
(detailing the regulatory freedom that states enjoy under the ACA).
294. Rate Increase Disclosure and Review Proposal, supra note 155, at 81006 (noting that only
eighteen states have authority to review rates for some or all of the large group market).
295. See supra Part II.C.3.
296. See infra Part V.C.2.
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statutory standard-one that gives insurance commissioners direct authority to
address the problem of excessive provider prices. 297 But that authority must be
flexible; it cannot take a one-size-fits all approach. There are many ways to
address price-related market failures in healthcare, and the new rate review
authority should afford an insurance commissioner the flexibility to develop and
apply a variety of methods to address price-related market failures. The
following proposed mechanisms, which illustrate a range of increasing regulatory
control, are but a few examples of such methods.
1. Point-of-Service Incentives
An insurance department could require insurers to include point-of-service
incentives in their health plans and provide demonstrable, significant projected
cost savings from these incentives as a condition of rate approval. Point-of-
service incentives are price control mechanisms that involve no direct regulatory
control of provider prices, but instead are designed to nudge consumers toward
lower cost providers through the use of financial incentives. Two examples of
point-of-service mechanisms are tiered cost sharing298 and reference pricing. 299
A tiered cost-sharing mechanism would place hospitals, physicians, and other
providers into cost-sharing tiers according to their costliness. For example,
health insurers could be required to include variable hospital deductibles of $0,
$500, or $1,000, depending on a hospital's tier. Likewise, physician copays could
range from $0, $20, or $35 based on their tier. Insurers could be required to
identify to the insurance commissioner the most expensive hospitals and
physicians and place them in the costliest tier as a condition of rate approval. 300
Reference pricing works on a similar principle by placing indirect price
pressure on providers through nudging consumers to lower-priced services.
Under reference pricing, insurers pay a specific benefit amount for a particular
297. In most but not all states this would require additional legislative authority. Some state
insurance commissioners already possess some authority to control the relationship between insurers
and providers in order to control costs. See, e.g., 32 R.I. CODE R. § 17:7(e) (LexisNexis 2016)
(requiring health insurers to adopt affordability standards developed by the commissioner and
including hospital contracting conditions as a condition for approval of health insurance rates). Rhode
Island has established hospital contracting provisions that limit annual hospital rate increases,
including quality incentive payments, to the U.S. All Urban Consumer Less Food and Energy CPI
(CPI-Urban) for the Northeast Region plus 1%, decreasing over time to CPI-U plus 0% by 2018. Id.
§ 2:10(d)(3)(E). Thus, the annual rate of increase for 2015 shall be no more than 2.7%. R.I. OFFICE OF
THE HEALTH INS. COMM'R, HEALTH INS. BULL. No. 2015-1, 2015 CPI-URBAN (AFFORDABILITY
STANDARDS) (2015), http://www.ohic.ri.gov/documents/12015%20-1 %20CPI%20Urban%20Afford
ability%20Standards.pdf.
298. Matthew B. Frank et al., The Impact of a Tiered Network on Hospital Choice, 50 HEALTH
SERVS. RES. 1628, 1628 (2015) (finding that "[d]ifferential cost sharing can steer patients toward
preferred hospitals" that offer lower costs and higher quality).
299. Paul B. Ginsburg & L. Gregory Pawlson, Seeking Lower Prices Where Providers Are
Consolidated: An Examination of Market and Policy Strategies, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1, 3-5 (2014)
(describing point-of-service cost control strategies).
300. This requirement counters the pressure providers would bring to bear on insurers to place
them in a lower tier.
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procedure, such as knee replacement, a colonoscopy, or magnetic resonance
imaging. Consumers are free to use any provider they wish, but if they choose a
provider that charges more than the reference price, the consumer must pay the
difference out of pocket.
Mandating such point-of-service incentives for all insurers as a condition of
rate approval could effectively negate provider threats, such as boycotts, and
help level the insurer-provider playing field with respect to price in two ways.
First, all insurers would be subject to the same point-of-service requirements.
Thus, no provider could take advantage of its strong market position to play
insurers off one another to secure higher prices. Second, an insurer that yielded
to the pressures of a particular provider to place that provider in a preferred
pricing tier or to set its reference price too high would risk denial of its rates. 301
2. Increasing Insurer Leverage Through Joint Negotiations
Another approach would be to coordinate payment negotiations between
all insurers and each must-have and market-dominant provider. Joint
negotiations would have one goal: to counter the ability of powerful providers to
demand higher prices by threatening to leave an insurer's network. Every insurer
fears a loss of customers if a must-have or market-dominant provider leaves its
network. This fear allows providers to play insurers off one another, giving those
providers greater leverage to extract higher prices. An insurance commissioner
could address this problem by requiring that insurers jointly contract for prices
with must-have and market-dominant providers, restoring some semblance of a
level playing field and negating the ability of the provider to threaten to abandon
the network of any one insurer. A provider's options would be limited to either
opting out or remaining in all insurer networks-an all-or-nothing proposition
that would undercut a provider's ability to walk away from any one insurer's
network. The insurance commissioner would not participate in the negotiations,
but would instead require insurers to participate in such joint negotiations as a
condition of rate approval.
3. Limiting the Growth of Contracted Prices
The next step up in regulatory control by insurance commissioners would be
to limit the annual growth of contracted provider prices. One strategy would be
to peg the growth of provider prices to some inflation-linked standard, such as
the rate of annual increases allowed by Medicare to its providers or the
Consumer Price Index (CPI).302 As a prerequisite to rate approval, insurers
301. Point-of-service strategies are not without drawbacks. These include difficulties ensuring
effective communication with consumers about out-of-pocket costs associated with various providers
and the empirical complications associated with designating cost-sharing tiers and provider payment
tiers. See Ginsburg & Pawlson, supra note 299, at 2-4. See generally John L. Adams et al., Physician
Cost Profiling-Reliability and Risk of Misclassification, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1014 (2010) (finding
that tiering of physicians with respect to costs of services may produce misleading results).
302. One state, Rhode Island, has already implemented such a standard. See supra note 297 and
accompanying text.
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would have to demonstrate that all new or renewed provider contracts (entered
into since its last rate filing) limit annual price increases to no more than the
inflation-linked standard. This mechanism would effectively eliminate provider
leverage as a factor in setting annual price increases, since providers could never
expect to get annual increases greater than those established by the inflation-
linked standard.
This approach certainly has some disadvantages. First, it would effectively
cement in place existing payment disparities between providers. For example,
the higher rates that the larger, more powerful hospital systems could command
in the past would continue to be higher than the lower rates paid to smaller
community hospitals.
Another problem would stem from the fact that provider payment rates are
often set years in advance. Health insurers often enter into multiyear contracts
with providers, locking in payment rates for years into the future.30 3 It is not
unusual for such contracts to last four of five years.3°4 As a result, the effect of a
cap on price increases would not be felt uniformly across all providers for several
years until all contracts had been renegotiated. However, over the long term, the
effects of this approach could be significant. The CPI has typically been lower
than average health insurance increases, 30 5 and Medicare payment rates have
generally increased at a much slower rate than those of private health
insurance. 306
4. Setting Payment Rates
Rate setting is the most interventionist approach of the four mechanisms
discussed in this Article. Under a rate-setting approach, insurers would be
required to make payments to providers according to standards established by an
insurance commissioner. For instance, providers could be required to use
Medicare payment methods and use Medicare rates (or some multiple
303. See, e.g., A Review of Hospital Billing and Collection Practices: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong. 114
(2004) (statement of Jack 0. Bovender, Jr., Chairman and CEO of Hospital Corporation of America)
(noting that Hospital Corporation of America has over 5,000 contracts with managed care providers
across the country and that many are multiyear contracts); Matthew Sturdevant, Anthem, Hartford
HealthCare Hammer Out Deal, HARTFORD COURANT (Oct. 3, 2014, 12:52 AM), http://www.courant.
com/business/Connecticut-insurance/hc-anthem-hartford-healthcare-1003-20141002-story.html (noting
that Anthem BCBS, Connecticut's largest health insurer, agreed to new multiyear contracts with five
Connecticut hospitals).
304. E.g., Care New England Health Sys. v. R.I. Office of the Health Ins. Comm'r, C.A. No. PC
10-6984, slip op. at 6-7 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2011), https://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/Decisions
Orders/decisions/10-6984.pdf (noting that BCBS of Rhode Island entered into five-year contracts in
2004 and four-year contracts in 2009 with Care New England Health System, a multihospital health
system).
305. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
306. See generally Cristina Boccuti & Marilyn Moon, Comparing Medicare and Private Insurers:
Growth Rates in Spending over Three Decades, 22 HEALTH AFF. 230 (2003) (finding that Medicare's
ability to price aggressively the services it covers has resulted in a lower growth rate for its healthcare
spending than the private sector).
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thereof)30 7 as a prerequisite to rate approval. This approach would make
payments to providers more equitable (i.e., providers in the same geographic
area would be paid similar rates) and would reduce insurers' administrative costs
by eliminating the need to negotiate separate contracts with different providers.
It would also simplify the insurers' processing of claims for payment since
providers would all be paid at the same rate.308 However, this approach also
would not be felt uniformly across all providers for several years until all existing
provider contracts expired.
Of course, price-setting in the medical context will evoke hysterical
criticisms and be decried as "Soviet-style" economics. Yet, medical price-setting
has taken place in the United States for over thirty years. In response to runaway
costs and excessive provider power, Medicare began setting prices for hospitals
in 1983309 and for physician services since 1992.310 And, as Uwe Reinhardt has
observed, "It's hardly likely that the Reagan administration or Congress thought
themselves inspired by Soviet theory .... These policy makers just thought the
new system made more economic sense." 311 And, the system has worked.
Medicare has realized a lower growth rate for healthcare spending over the last
few decades than private health insurance. 312
Of course, one of the complaints about Medicare rate setting is that
allegedly low Medicare rates cause hospitals to increase their fees to other
payers, notably those who are privately insured. Indeed, hospitals claim that they
need to make up for low Medicare and Medicaid payment rates by shifting costs
to private payers. In other words, hospitals charge private payers more because
they must do so to stay in business. 313 However, the available evidence suggests
otherwise. Hospitals command higher fees from private health insurers because
of their market power, not merely to make up alleged deficits created by stingy
307. See Robert Murray, The Case for a Coordinated System of Provider Payments in the United
States, 37 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 679, 689-90 (2012) (suggesting a price cap as a multiple of
Medicare rates, such as 150% to 175% of Medicare rates).
308. See Jonathan Skinner et al., The 125 Percent Solution: Fixing Variations in Health Care
Prices, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 26, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/08/26/the-125-percent-
solution-fixing-variations-in-health-care-prices/ ("We suggest a short-term solution: The federal
Medicare program has in place a complete system of prices for every procedure and treatment. It's not
perfect, but it is uniform across regions, with a cost-of-living adjustment that pays more in expensive
cities and less in rural areas. If every patient and every insurance company always had the option of
paying 125 percent of the Medicare price for any service, we would effectively cap the worst of the
price spikes.").
309. See Rick Mayes, The Origins, Development, and Passage of Medicare's Revolutionary
Prospective Payment System, 62 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED Sci. 21, 51 (2007).
310. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Medicare's Soviet Label, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX BLOG (Nov. 12,
2010,6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/12/medicares-soviet-label/.
311. Id.
312. See Boccuti & Moon, supra note 306.
313. See Austin Frakt, Hospitals Are Wrong About Shifting Costs to Private Insurers, N.Y.
TIMES: UPSHOT (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/24/upshot/why-hospitals-are-wrong-
about-shifting-costs-to-private-insurers.html? r=0 ("To hear some hospital executives tell it, they have
to make up payment shortfalls from Medicaid and Medicare by charging higher prices to privately
insured patients. How else could a hospital stay afloat if it didn't?").
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government payers. 314  Indeed, there is evidence that when Medicare
reimbursements are cut, some hospitals have reduced their costs or output rather
than shift more costs to private payers.
315
Opponents to price controls will also argue that price-setting inevitably
leads to increased utilization by providers trying to make up for lost income.
Their argument rests primarily on the Maryland experience with hospital price-
setting. Since 1977, Maryland's independent rate-setting agency, the Maryland
Health Services Cost Review Commission, has set hospital rates for all payers,
including Medicare and Medicaid. 316 After imposing hospital price constraints,
patient volume increased in Maryland hospitals. 317 The main problem with the
Maryland case is that there may be causal factors other than price controls
driving the increased utilization. Nevertheless, the Maryland experience provides
the most salient argument against any price-setting strategy that is not coupled
with utilization control.
As noted above, however, empirical evidence suggests that hospitals react
to price controls by lowering costs and volume, rather than increasing the
volume of services provided. A recent long-term, well-controlled study that
tracked changes to Medicare payments data from ten states from 1995 to 2009
found that a 10% reduction in Medicare price was ultimately associated with a
4.6% reduction in discharges among the Medicare patients.318 In other words,
hospitals did not respond to lower Medicare prices by increasing utilization.
Instead they lowered utilization of Medicare services. Furthermore, hospitals did
not cost-shift by increasing utilization of services paid for by private insurance.
Instead, hospitals responded to price cuts by reducing their scale of
operations.319
314. See Austin B. Frakt, How Much Do Hospitals Cost Shift? A Review of the Evidence, 89
MILBANK Q. 90, 123 (2011); Chapin White, Contrary to Cost-Shift Theory, Lower Medicare Hospital
Payment Rates for Inpatient Care Lead to Lower Private Payment Rates, 32 HEALTH AFF. 935, 939-41
(2013).
315. See Chapin White & Tracy Yee, When Medicare Cuts Hospital Prices, Seniors Use Less
Inpatient Care, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1789, 1794 (2013) (concluding that Medicare payment reductions
cause hospitals to reduce capacity and provide fewer services rather than shift costs to other payers);
David Dranove et al., How Do Hospitals Respond to Negative Financial Shocks? The Impact of the
2008 Stock Market Crash 30 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper
18853, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18853.pdf (concluding that hospitals do not shift costs, but
instead cut costs when faced with reductions in Medicare or Medicaid payments).
316. See Robert Murray, Setting Hospital Rates to Control Costs, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1395, 1395-96
(2009); see also HSCRC Overview, MD. HEALTH SERVS. COST REV. COMM'N, http://www.hscrc.state.
md.us/aboutHSCRC.cfm (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
317. See Murray, supra note 316, at 1403 ("Although Maryland has performed well in
controlling hospital length-of-stay, cost per admission, and the rate of growth of hospitals' year-to-year
payment levels, the growth in overall hospital volume (largely admissions and outpatient visits) in
recent years has undermined the regulatory system's overall cost performance."); Mark Pauly &
Robert Town, Maryland Exceptionalism? All-Payers Regulation and Health Care System Efficiency, 37
J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 697,700-01 (2012).
318. White & Yee, supra note 315, at 1789.
319. See Id. at 1794 ("In general, hospitals seem to behave like a prototypical profit-maximizing
firm: They increase output when they are paid higher prices for that output, and they decrease output
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C. Likely Objections to a New Rate Review Process
A new rate review process that addresses market failures would certainly
generate objections, as do all efforts to control healthcare costs or increase
regulation. While not an exhaustive list, the following represent the most likely
general objections to an expanded rate review process.
1. There Would Be Significant Political Obstacles
There would indeed be significant political hurdles to implementing this
new rate review process. Health insurance payments are a major source of
income for the physicians, hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, and others in
the medical services industry. Regulatory controls leading to lower health
insurance payments would generate significant political opposition from the
medical services industry. This may be why the ACA's cost control measures for
private health insurance are so weak. 320 Indeed, the political risks of insurance-
based cost control are evident in the failed Clinton health reform plan of 1993-
94. The Clinton plan included de facto budgetary caps on health spending,
including caps on private health insurance premiums. This threat to the income
of the medical services industry helped kill the Clinton plan. 321
While rate review-based efforts to control prices would undoubtedly
generate political opposition from powerful hospitals and physicians, opposition
to enhanced rate review would not likely be as fierce as it was in 1993 and 1994
with the Clinton plan because, unlike then, health insurers are less likely to
oppose rate review-based price controls now. Health insurers would benefit from
such controls through lower claims costs and perhaps lower administrative costs
associated with more closely controlled prices. Nevertheless, increasing an
insurance commissioner's authority would not be an easy sell to state
legislatures, especially in light of the predictable rhetoric claiming price controls
would lead to rationing or "death panels." 322
when the costs of production rise."). The evidence on physicians is mixed. There is evidence that
physicians respond to a decrease in payments with higher utilization. See, e.g., Mireille Jacobson et al.,
How Medicare's Payment Cuts for Cancer Chemotherapy Drugs Changed Patterns of Treatment, 29
HEALTH AFF. 1391 (2010) (finding physicians responded to a decrease in price for a chemotherapy
drug by increasing the rate of chemotherapy treatment for patients with lung cancer, increasing the
rate of chemotherapy for patients with newly diagnosed cancer, and switching to more costly
chemotherapy agents). There is also evidence that physicians respond to price cuts by better managing
care and through lower use of marginally effective services. See, e.g., Carrie H. Colla et al., Impact of
Payment Reform on Chemotherapy at the End of Life, 8 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. e6s, el2s (2012) (finding
that "for a range of services with marginal value, a reduction in fee-for-service reimbursement can
better align payment with quality-of-care goals").
320. Marmor et al., supra note 94, at 486; Jonathan Oberlander, Throwing Darts: Americans'
Elusive Search for Health Care Cost Control, 36 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 477 (2011).
321. Oberlander, supra note 320, at 478-479.
322. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Death Panels and the Rhetoric of Rationing, 13 NEV. L.J.
872 (2013) for a discussion of continued resistance to universal healthcare in the U.S. based on two
taboos: taxation and rationing.
[Vol. 88
HEALTH INSURANCE RATE REVIEW
2. ERISA
ERISA is often an impediment to state-based health insurance reform.32 3
Congress enacted ERISA to establish minimum standards for private employee
retirement and benefit plans, including plans covering health insurance
benefits. 324 ERISA does not, however, mandate any specific benefits or regulate
the substantive content of benefit plans. Rather, ERISA contains provisions that
preempt state laws that "relate to" employee benefit plans.325 This means that
states cannot dictate the content or conditions of self-funded employee benefit
plans. States can, however, regulate the private insurance that is sold to
employers. 326 Thus, while ERISA does not preempt any efforts to mandate price
controls on heath insurers, self-insured employers would not be subject to such
regulation. This begs the question: How could price controls through rate review
apply to self-insured employer groups? As briefly discussed earlier, the answer is
quite simple. In addition to administering their own fully insured plans, health
insurers also administer most self-insured plans. But, regardless of whether a
patient is covered by a fully insured or self-funded plan, the insurer pays the
provider treating that patient according to the payment terms of the contract
between the insurer and the provider. Those payment terms cover all claims
processed by the insurer for that provider, regardless of whether those claims
originated under a fully insured or self-insured group plan. 327 This means that
the new rate review mechanisms suggested in this Article, like joint negotiations,
capping increases, and rate setting, would have a spillover effect on ERISA self-
insured plans. Any other outcome would entail administrative costs and
difficulties that insurers that administer self-insured plans simply would not
undertake. For example, it is highly unlikely that an insurer would negotiate
separate provider contracts for every provider in its network, one for self-insured
plans and another for fully insured plans, and set up separate internal payment
systems for each contract. Moreover, no self-funded employer group plan would
object to benefitting from the cost savings that would flow from the new rate
review process. Thus, ERISA is unlikely to present a substantial obstacle to a
state's efforts to address healthcare market failures through rate review.
3. What About Federal Antitrust Laws?
Would the rate review mechanisms suggested in this Article violate federal
antitrust laws? No. First, the MFA exempts the business of insurance from
federal antitrust law to the extent it is regulated by state law, with the exception
of agreements or acts of boycott, coercion, or intimidation. 328 However, a state
323. Peter D. Jacobson, The Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Reform: Opportunities and
Limits, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 86, 88, 89 (2009) ("Any comprehensive state-level health reform
legislation ... must take into account the states' vulnerability to ERISA preemption.").
324. Id. at 89.
325. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012).
326. See id. § 1144(b)(2)(A); Korobkin, supra note 185, at 89.
327. See supra Part II.C.3 for a discussion of the specifics of such payment terms.
328. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1013 (2012).
20161
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
action exemption would also apply. The state action exemption would apply if
the state compels the anticompetitive activity, the activity is essential to a state
regulatory scheme inconsistent with the federal antitrust laws or required as part
of a scheme that the state clearly articulates and actively supervises, and the
activity is one in which the state has a legitimate regulatory interest. 329 Indeed,
there is historical precedent for state insurance commissioners regulating rates.
When Blue Cross insurers operated under their original mode of operation, as
financing operations for hospitals through direct payment to hospitals, state
insurance departments had authority to regulate the contracts between Blue
Cross insurers and hospitals and physicians, including payments terms. Antitrust
laws were not a concern. 330
4. Why Not Fix the Underlying Market?
Advocates of market-based solutions argue that price controls are not a
good substitute for efforts directed at the root causes of high provider prices. As
Mark Pauly and Robert Town have suggested when discussing the Maryland
rate-setting system:
We may thus be better off by advocating leaving hospital regulation
aside and concentrating necessarily limited political attention and clout
on what drives spending growth, rather than on what causes the
messengers to deliver the bad news. The tax exclusion, subsidies, and
patents that increase the amount and prices of cost-increasing technical
change, vigorous antitrust enforcement, and the ever elusive leadership
and climate change that could reduce variations in medical practice
might all be better points of attention than trying to control a price or
profit margin, which is in many ways an effect rather than a cause of
spending growth. At most, regulation could be limited to markets
unable to be workably competitive; even here the case would have to
be made that the skill and political climate is as favorable to good
regulation as it has been in Maryland. 331
Their reasoning is hard to argue with, except with respect to whether the
implementation of all the changes they suggest is realistic. Provider prices are
high now. Health insurance costs are continuing to increase at a rate that
outstrips general inflation. Efforts to eliminate subsidies, undo provider
329. The state action immunity doctrine, set out in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943),
provides a form of "inverse preemption," allowing a state to stave off federal antitrust enforcement of
anticompetitive behavior by imposing state regulation over that behavior. See Frank H. Easterbrook,
Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 25 (1983) (describing Parker's state
action immunity doctrine as a form of "inverse preemption"). In order for the exemption to apply, the
state must clearly articulate its policy to substitute regulation for market competition and must actively
supervise implementation of that policy. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
330. See, e.g., Larry D. Carlson, The Insurance Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 57 TEx. L.
REV. 1127, 1187-88 (1979) (describing laws in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts that provided the state
insurance commissioner authority to approve contracts between BCBS corporations and providers,
including approval of reimbursement terms).
331. Pauly & Town, supra note 317, at 706.
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networks, and change tax laws will require sustained political attention,
continuous legislative efforts, and a good deal of time. When faced with the
choice between a long-term campaign to make multiple fundamental system
changes and concentrating limited political attention on controlling market
failure through insurance rate regulation, the latter is the more realistic option.
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF HEALTH INSURANCE RATE REVIEW
The ACA has reaffirmed the private insurance model as the main
healthcare financing system for the U.S. population not covered by government
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. Yet, this system of healthcare
financing through private insurance can no longer simply import regulatory
practices that are better suited to other forms of insurance. Rate review is a
perfect example. The ACA has implemented an extensive federal rate review
process that uses as its model the traditional property-casualty approach to rate
regulation. The results are predicable. The ACA's rate review process has not
and will not limit health insurance price increases because, as Wendy Mariner
and others have argued, health insurance is fundamentally different from other
types of insurance.332 Sadly, the drafters of the ACA and HHS did not recognize
that a different mode of rate regulation should apply to health insurance. This
not only led to provisions in the ACA that limited the effectiveness of rate
review, but also to overblown claims of what rate review can and is doing to save
consumers money. None of this, however, prevents any state from recognizing
that a different mode of rate review ought to apply to health insurance. This
Article has offered a critical analysis of the ACA's rate review provision in the
hope that state legislators, policymakers, and insurance regulators will recognize
the full potential of a rate review process specifically tailored to health insurance.
332. Mariner, supra note 253, at 450.
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